Thursday, May 5, 2011

Security Dimension of Transfer of Land Rights: Policy Implications and Strategic Choices

By Francis Hualupmomi
The debate on transfer of land rights from state to landowners by some political elites, elites, landowners and the populous provoke interesting security implications for PNG. Martin Namarong in his recent article “Land: questions of ownership & sovereignty” on April 26, 2011 in PNG Attitude provides us a logical yet most critical analysis on this issue. I expand his scope of analysis focusing on security dimension and its policy implications.
Some critiques observed that land rights which is normatively considered as a natural birth right of citizens given the traditional heritage in Melanesian society is being politically exploited by competing interests. In quest for modernization and economic imperatives state leadership in the governance of redistribution of wealth has been compromised with external interests provoking suspicious and mutual distrust in the society. The proponents of transfer of land rights argue that the state under a social contract to prudently manage national interest, i.e. landownership in resources, on behalf of its citizens appears contradictory and unwarranted to some extent of mismanagement as exclusively witnessed in unequal benefits-sharing in Panguna Mine, followed by LNG and others.
The issue at hand though, as argued by several legalists and politicians is equal distribution of resources between state and MNCs and landowners. Whilst this may sound welcoming for landowners, there are adverse implications to national security of the state should critical thoughts are not well conceptualized.
First, Sovereignty of the state will be compromised and systematically undermined under the Westphalia system. Sovereignty of the state alludes to the notion of legitimacy, the ‘right to rule’ by the ‘rule of law’ through a social contract. State on behalf of the mass through social contract expressed through election is mandated to prudently manage individual interest legally binded as a collective interest. On this premise, the major argument is that state as a ‘rational man’ is the only legal entrusted custodian possessing legitimate capacity and capability to manage natural resources on behalf of the landowners.
Second, we expect a most likely rebellion by landowners given prolong unsatisfactory perceptions on the government’s management of redistribution of resources. several mini scale rebellion against the state and MNCs such as threats of plant closure, clash with security personals (both state and non-state) to name a few since the operation of MNCs in PNG indicate a tendency of proliferation of near future large scale rebellion.
More over, mining and petroleum in highlands region suggest Mercenary-like military-build over time with given aggregate of monitory incentives through loyalties and dividends. The Singirok Gun Summit report proves threatening and worrisome. The full transfer of landownership rights to land owners is a dangerous and most risky exercise. Legitimizing power on the hands of landlords would most likely convert them into power maximisers constructing real threats to state, MNCs and populous.
As situation reached its full peak the worst case scenario is a mini scale foreign military intervention. Energy is an important economic and strategic interest of any state which if under any circumstances is threatened will instruct military intervention to protect its citizens and socio-economic infrastructures. The Sandline crises, East Timor, Libya, Iraq, Kosovo, Georgia, are some cases in point. A large scale clash between landowners and state and private security personnel is yet to trigger. Recently it was also reported that few southern highlanders had clash with G4S security personals.
The landowners lack capacity and capability to manage resources should the rights are legally transferred. In my view, it would be quite impossible for landowners to manage resources. There are a lot of issues associated with this view. First, we expect unwise spending by landowners in inferior good and services, such as gambling and prostitution in expensive corridors in city lights domestically or overseas. Economic implications may include capital flight and at some point inserting monitory pressure on the economy such as inflation, etc. We also expect increasing social problems such as domestic martial affairs, spread of incurable disease and proliferation of prostitution, transnational crimes, etc.
Nevertheless, the call for autonomy is too early and may not be in the best interest of PNG. Such calls will only provide precedence for autonomization by other provinces and regions. Most provinces lack capacity to administer this process. Finally, transfer of land rights may construct a resource bias in development. Some provinces lack resources and monopoly of resources may not be equally distributed in PNG in aggregate terms.
Given these security implications on the transfer of land rights some strategic choices have to be rationally calculated to maximize national interest to avoid unexpected security challenges:
1. Rectify the legal parameters defining the legitimacy of land rights with state still having some legitimacy over management of resources;
2. Borrow Brunei’s model of state-landowner partnership- state should partner with landowners by providing them monitory incentives through loan to establish national companies without external influence. The state-national companies must employ highly qualified expatriates including nationals with full social protection;
3. The state based on social contract as a legitimate custodian should renegotiate for an absolute gain to attain a 50-50% share, .i.e. a break up of state 30%- landowners 30% and MNCs 40%; and
4. Autonomy is not in the best interest of PNG given the lack of political and administrative capacity.
In sum, absolute gain through equal wealth redistribution must be the national interest in resource sectors.

No comments:

Post a Comment