By Francis Hualupmomi in China
The 2012 increase in Australian Aid Budget for PNG raises an interesting question: Is it a rational foreign policy choice?
In international relations, Aid is perceived as one of the most effective soft power foreign policy tools to win hearts and minds of people in a given state of interest by the big power. In this logic, Aid is designed and deployed to either weaken or to strengthen a state depending on the nature of the interest of donor. For instance, in some states in Africa, although there are continuous aid donations from former colonials yet development remains less progressive. This can also be said to PNG with AusAid. Aid therefore, is highly questionable in many developing countries.
According to Joanna McCarthy Australia will donate $520 million in Aid to PNG next year, making it the second biggest recipient. Development Policy Centre also noted that this will be an increase from $4.3bn in 2010-11 to $4.8bn in 2011-12–or from 0.33% to 0.35% of GNI (Gross National Income). Although Australia is still trailing behind other OECDs countries in Aid, it promised to continue increase the figure beyond 2012 given the positive prediction of economic growth from 2012-2016.
The focus of AusAid in PNG expressed in terms of its goals and objectives is to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) through good governance and reducing poverty focusing on strengthening health and education sectors. Whilst this may sound positive in PNG, whether it will be translated into tangible outcomes remain an issue and challenge.
This raises an important question, is AusAid a development tool or politically engineered foreign policy tool aimed at pursuing Australia’s own national interest in the region? These questions can help us calculate Canberra’s intent and motive and its policy implications behind increase in Aid. It is interesting to note that although the trend of Aid has increased annually PNG remains an undeveloped and often blended as a failed state since independence. If Australia’s Aid is generous why do PNG continue to experience development problems?
From observation, since independence with Australia’s development assistance under different political regimes nothing has really changed much in PNG’s development and modernization agenda. Socio-economic landscape remains worsening until recently given poor socio-economic such as health and education indicators, poor higher education socio-economic infrastructures, poor economic infrastructures, corruption, etc.
Moreover, with changes in geopolitical landscape in the Pacific region, especially with the rise of China and its influence in the region, Australia is caught in between the thin red lines. China’s presence and its influence has greatly affected the island nations especially PNG, Fiji and others through its soft power diplomacy. China is the second largest aid donor after Australia in the region. China offer soft or unconditional aid to finance development in the region. PNG is the biggest recipient of Chinese Aid. There is positive effect of Chinese Aid on PNG’s socio-economic development.
Politically, Australia is not only under pressure from Washington over Chinese regional influence but is worried and in fear that it is slowly loosing its peripheries in the region. This is the most immediate conundrum facing Australia in the region. This could suggest that Canberra’s increase in Aid is only a geopolitical competition against China in the region.
If this is the intent and motive behind the increase, this may have policy implications.
First, should PNG development situations continue to be positively affected by other donors than Australian Aid there could be a tendency of shift in policy behavior. There is a feeling of mistrust on Australia’s development assistance. Political leaders and elites may shift preferences to other donors such as China, EU, etc, should they perceive AusAid as an impediment to socio-economic development progress.
Second, history has shown that geostrategic competitions have structural implications in the economy. The more a state spends on relative strategic competitions there is a tendency of it to collapse. The economy might be affected increasing social chaos and poverty. The competition between US and Russia during Cold War shows that strategic competition, for instance, on Mutual Destructive Weapons led Russia to unwise spending on armaments and consequently its collapse.
Given this conundrum in Aid, what should Australia do? Australia should be mindful in playing Aid card in geopolitical competition. Australia should also consider how it could cooperate with other big important partners in aid diplomacy in the region. A cautious and constructive Aid management strategy is necessary to avoid clash of national interest. Should Australia is not careful enough this could be a waste of tax payers’ money and loosing of grip on its major conventional peripheries in the region.
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
Friday, May 13, 2011
Who Should Supersede Grand Chief Somare?
Francis Hualupmomi, in China
With Prime Minister (PM) Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare officially being declared medically unfit in maintaining and continuing National Alliance-Coalition(NA) leadership until next election, the question one might ask is who will supersede his leadership? I provide a prediction premised on observation.
It is quite difficult to predict Sir Michael’s successor given the complexity of NA’s coalition make-up, however, from observation we can only construct some most-likely scenarios.
The current NA-Coalition government under Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare over the years has had several leadership competitions among coalition political parties based on regional politics.
From evidence gathered, leadership tussle is between Highlands’ regional camp and Momase Camp, whilst Southern and the Nuigini Islands regional camps seem moderate and bandwagoning.
From this constellation, we can assume a common pattern that Highlands and Momase camps will compete for leadership. We expect three political factions within Highlands regional bloc, the O’Neil’s group, and a split in Enga between current acting PM, Sam Abel’s group, and former deputy PM leader and highlands hot candidate Don Polye’s group. The other highlands political leaders may most likely bandwagon these three groupings depending on their most given preferences.
Given highland’s complex political culture, we expect that a split in Engan groupings would most likely shift alliance to Southern Highlands group. In Southern Highlands, the most likely hottest candidate will be Peter O’Neil. However, that does not dispute a change in Engan politics. Should Engan MPs unite we expect a different scenario. Don Polye would be most likely to assume leadership than Abal.
On the other side of the coin, the Momase camp may also face the similar political competition. We expect a split between Patrick Pruaitch and Arthur Somare. Although both leaders are highly competitive, Arthur may assume leadership for three major reasons. First, Arthur will be most likely preferred over Pruaitch to maintain Grand Chief’s Legacy. Second, Arthur has played an important role in political economic development by bringing ashore many high impact projects such as LNG and public enterprise reforms while serving several ministerial portfolios. Final, Arthur’s leadership may attract NA support in honor and recognition of Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare.
In the middle camp, we have Nuigini Islands and Southern camps, both of which do not possess potential candidates for the leadership. In Nuigini Islands camp, we expect Paul Tiensten to command bandwagoning with Momase camp. In Southern camp, there is a vacuum for possible PM contender after the defection of former deputy Prime Minister, Sir Puka Temu, to Opposition.
Given this political situation, we expect two possible scenarios. First, both camps may remain faithful with Momase camp in fear of loosing leadership to highlands region. Second, there will be a split within the camps between Pro-Somare and pro-Pruaitch factions. Although there is possibility of defections of MPs in coastal regional bloc to highlands regional bloc this may less likely to occur.
From the situational analysis, we can draw some conclusions. First, a possible political instability within NA-Coalition is inevitable. Second, we expect some unexpected leadership shift in highlands regional camp with new faces should there be a stalemate in leadership between Enga and Southern Highlands. Third, we expect split in Momase regional camp, however, it is most likely that Arthur may possibly assume leadership. Fourth, we also expect a split between Nuigini Islands and Southern regional Camps; however, it is most likely that both will support Momase camp.
This leaves us with four most likely possible candidates: Arthur; Abal; Polye; and O’Neil. In projecting a rough prediction, we expect Arthur Somare to reign should there is stalemate between highlands regional MPs. However, should highlands regional MPs unite, we expect Don Polye to assume leadership.
With Prime Minister (PM) Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare officially being declared medically unfit in maintaining and continuing National Alliance-Coalition(NA) leadership until next election, the question one might ask is who will supersede his leadership? I provide a prediction premised on observation.
It is quite difficult to predict Sir Michael’s successor given the complexity of NA’s coalition make-up, however, from observation we can only construct some most-likely scenarios.
The current NA-Coalition government under Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare over the years has had several leadership competitions among coalition political parties based on regional politics.
From evidence gathered, leadership tussle is between Highlands’ regional camp and Momase Camp, whilst Southern and the Nuigini Islands regional camps seem moderate and bandwagoning.
From this constellation, we can assume a common pattern that Highlands and Momase camps will compete for leadership. We expect three political factions within Highlands regional bloc, the O’Neil’s group, and a split in Enga between current acting PM, Sam Abel’s group, and former deputy PM leader and highlands hot candidate Don Polye’s group. The other highlands political leaders may most likely bandwagon these three groupings depending on their most given preferences.
Given highland’s complex political culture, we expect that a split in Engan groupings would most likely shift alliance to Southern Highlands group. In Southern Highlands, the most likely hottest candidate will be Peter O’Neil. However, that does not dispute a change in Engan politics. Should Engan MPs unite we expect a different scenario. Don Polye would be most likely to assume leadership than Abal.
On the other side of the coin, the Momase camp may also face the similar political competition. We expect a split between Patrick Pruaitch and Arthur Somare. Although both leaders are highly competitive, Arthur may assume leadership for three major reasons. First, Arthur will be most likely preferred over Pruaitch to maintain Grand Chief’s Legacy. Second, Arthur has played an important role in political economic development by bringing ashore many high impact projects such as LNG and public enterprise reforms while serving several ministerial portfolios. Final, Arthur’s leadership may attract NA support in honor and recognition of Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare.
In the middle camp, we have Nuigini Islands and Southern camps, both of which do not possess potential candidates for the leadership. In Nuigini Islands camp, we expect Paul Tiensten to command bandwagoning with Momase camp. In Southern camp, there is a vacuum for possible PM contender after the defection of former deputy Prime Minister, Sir Puka Temu, to Opposition.
Given this political situation, we expect two possible scenarios. First, both camps may remain faithful with Momase camp in fear of loosing leadership to highlands region. Second, there will be a split within the camps between Pro-Somare and pro-Pruaitch factions. Although there is possibility of defections of MPs in coastal regional bloc to highlands regional bloc this may less likely to occur.
From the situational analysis, we can draw some conclusions. First, a possible political instability within NA-Coalition is inevitable. Second, we expect some unexpected leadership shift in highlands regional camp with new faces should there be a stalemate in leadership between Enga and Southern Highlands. Third, we expect split in Momase regional camp, however, it is most likely that Arthur may possibly assume leadership. Fourth, we also expect a split between Nuigini Islands and Southern regional Camps; however, it is most likely that both will support Momase camp.
This leaves us with four most likely possible candidates: Arthur; Abal; Polye; and O’Neil. In projecting a rough prediction, we expect Arthur Somare to reign should there is stalemate between highlands regional MPs. However, should highlands regional MPs unite, we expect Don Polye to assume leadership.
Thursday, May 12, 2011
Political Economy of China’s Economic Reform: Lessons for PNG Vision 2050
By Francis Hualupmomi
In this article, I draw some interesting lessons from China’s Economic Reform. I hope it provides some insights to drive Vision 2050. Today, China boasts the second largest world economy superseding Japan in 2010. China’s remarkable economic success was driven by its post-Mao economic reform. The question is: What factors stimulate its economic success? Is there a lesson for PNG?
China’s Economic Reform and Its Characteristics
Reform
Sacks and Woo (2003) accentuate that China is now in the midst of three historic economic transformations and transition from a planned economy to a market economy, economic development from a largely subsistence peasant economy to an industrialized economy with a modern service sector, and economic globalization from autarky to an important node within the global production network. The economic reform of China begins in 1979 under Deng Xiaoping. Deng pursued an “Open Door Policy” from Mao’s “Isolation Policy” employing a hybrid model of socialist free market. The reform focuses on international trade and privatization of all state-owned enterprises.
In 1990, six special economic zones were established including Shanghai Pudong zone specifically designed for attracting foreign capital. The government supported agriculture through creation of contract responsibilities. In this special arrangement, farmers could sell their commodities abroad with an aim to finance China’s modernization agenda.
Between late 1980s and early 1990s, the focus was on creating a pricing system using dual tracking system and increasing the role of state in resource allocation. The government diversified the market economy of private enterprises and foreign capital by reducing state monopoly. The market economy was left to invisible hands to influence economic pattern in driving the economy.
By late 1990s, the government focuses on reforming unprofitable state enterprises and banking system insolvency. State-owned enterprises and banks underwent a rapid transformation promoting effectiveness and efficiency. In the beginning of 21st century under Hu Jintao, focus was on domestic economic development to ensure a harmonious society.
Types of Business Enterprises Reform
There are four main types of enterprise reform that stimulated China’s economic success. The first is the privatization of state-owned enterprise managed by the Bureau of Managing Council. In this new arrangement, workers do not own shares but only receive salary based on performance. The Bureau employs mostly Chinese western-graduate nationals and homegrown nationals to manage the enterprises with an objective to give confidence to their own nationals.
Second, the stock companies were converted from state control to private control. In this arrangement, enterprises earn some shares whilst the rest go to state. Managers are also legally allowed to hold some shares.
Third, the government promoted a market-oriented private business protected by the government. All Banks provide low interest loans to variety of business to facilitate economic modernization. Final and last is the conversion of foreign fund enterprises (joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprise).
Special Chinese Characteristics of the Economic Reform
The Chinese economic reform constitutes some distinct characteristics which play an important role in driving the economy.
• State-led policies
• Decentralization of state powers to different individuals, groups, and business in decision making and management of the market economy
• A socialist free market
• Development of special economic zones
• Diversification of state banks to meet private business needs at a low interest rates
• Employ highly educated nationals
• Combination of chinese characteristics and modern management skills
• Encourage modern management and technological innovation
• Chinese are great learners and hardworking – Work to live philosophy
• Non-state led enterprise reform
• International trade focusing on agricultural areas as the economic base
• Convert state-owned entities into private business or enterprises
Success of the Economic Reform
The reform was successful for over 3 decades. The outcome from three processes of economic transformation was astounding proving a sustainable average annual GDP growth rate of 8% from 1979–2011. Industrialization, open organization and internationalization extremely drive the shift towards market economy.
Since the reform in 1979 the economy has grown rapidly. In 2004, China was ranked 6th in world economy. The GDP per capita was about US$ 1267. In the same year, the IMF reported an increase in GDP by 9.5% up to US$ 1.647 trillion. In 2011, China’s economy is expected to grow by 8% despite slow recovery in 2008 economic crises (Mussa, 2010).
The reform overwhelmingly attracted foreign investment, for instance, in 2004, 45% export was produced by foreign funds and enterprises. China was ranked as the third biggest trading country after US and EU. More than 20% of foreign trade came from china as reported by IMF.
Interestingly, free market under invisible hand had played an important role in the economy. In 2001, the central command was replaced by market and economic forces with entry of China in WTO. Decisions were decentralized. Chinese management of business was also successful with a combination of Chinese culture and modern management skills. Chinese were more eager to learn by experience and apply management innovation and technological innovation.
What are the Lessons for PNG?
Drawing from significant lessons in China’s economic reform, PNG can drive Vision 2050 by:
1. Diversifying the market economy into special economic zones:
• Agriculture as the backbone of international trade in some highlands and coastal regions
• Encourage more banking system through the country, more ICT Business, competition in state-owned enterprises and stock markets
1. State playing an important role in creating a conducive environment for economic take-off through sound economic policies
2. Combine indigenous knowledge with modern innovative management skills and technological skills
3. People being eager to learn and hardworking – PNG must strive to ‘work to live’ rather than ‘live to work’
In this article, I draw some interesting lessons from China’s Economic Reform. I hope it provides some insights to drive Vision 2050. Today, China boasts the second largest world economy superseding Japan in 2010. China’s remarkable economic success was driven by its post-Mao economic reform. The question is: What factors stimulate its economic success? Is there a lesson for PNG?
China’s Economic Reform and Its Characteristics
Reform
Sacks and Woo (2003) accentuate that China is now in the midst of three historic economic transformations and transition from a planned economy to a market economy, economic development from a largely subsistence peasant economy to an industrialized economy with a modern service sector, and economic globalization from autarky to an important node within the global production network. The economic reform of China begins in 1979 under Deng Xiaoping. Deng pursued an “Open Door Policy” from Mao’s “Isolation Policy” employing a hybrid model of socialist free market. The reform focuses on international trade and privatization of all state-owned enterprises.
In 1990, six special economic zones were established including Shanghai Pudong zone specifically designed for attracting foreign capital. The government supported agriculture through creation of contract responsibilities. In this special arrangement, farmers could sell their commodities abroad with an aim to finance China’s modernization agenda.
Between late 1980s and early 1990s, the focus was on creating a pricing system using dual tracking system and increasing the role of state in resource allocation. The government diversified the market economy of private enterprises and foreign capital by reducing state monopoly. The market economy was left to invisible hands to influence economic pattern in driving the economy.
By late 1990s, the government focuses on reforming unprofitable state enterprises and banking system insolvency. State-owned enterprises and banks underwent a rapid transformation promoting effectiveness and efficiency. In the beginning of 21st century under Hu Jintao, focus was on domestic economic development to ensure a harmonious society.
Types of Business Enterprises Reform
There are four main types of enterprise reform that stimulated China’s economic success. The first is the privatization of state-owned enterprise managed by the Bureau of Managing Council. In this new arrangement, workers do not own shares but only receive salary based on performance. The Bureau employs mostly Chinese western-graduate nationals and homegrown nationals to manage the enterprises with an objective to give confidence to their own nationals.
Second, the stock companies were converted from state control to private control. In this arrangement, enterprises earn some shares whilst the rest go to state. Managers are also legally allowed to hold some shares.
Third, the government promoted a market-oriented private business protected by the government. All Banks provide low interest loans to variety of business to facilitate economic modernization. Final and last is the conversion of foreign fund enterprises (joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprise).
Special Chinese Characteristics of the Economic Reform
The Chinese economic reform constitutes some distinct characteristics which play an important role in driving the economy.
• State-led policies
• Decentralization of state powers to different individuals, groups, and business in decision making and management of the market economy
• A socialist free market
• Development of special economic zones
• Diversification of state banks to meet private business needs at a low interest rates
• Employ highly educated nationals
• Combination of chinese characteristics and modern management skills
• Encourage modern management and technological innovation
• Chinese are great learners and hardworking – Work to live philosophy
• Non-state led enterprise reform
• International trade focusing on agricultural areas as the economic base
• Convert state-owned entities into private business or enterprises
Success of the Economic Reform
The reform was successful for over 3 decades. The outcome from three processes of economic transformation was astounding proving a sustainable average annual GDP growth rate of 8% from 1979–2011. Industrialization, open organization and internationalization extremely drive the shift towards market economy.
Since the reform in 1979 the economy has grown rapidly. In 2004, China was ranked 6th in world economy. The GDP per capita was about US$ 1267. In the same year, the IMF reported an increase in GDP by 9.5% up to US$ 1.647 trillion. In 2011, China’s economy is expected to grow by 8% despite slow recovery in 2008 economic crises (Mussa, 2010).
The reform overwhelmingly attracted foreign investment, for instance, in 2004, 45% export was produced by foreign funds and enterprises. China was ranked as the third biggest trading country after US and EU. More than 20% of foreign trade came from china as reported by IMF.
Interestingly, free market under invisible hand had played an important role in the economy. In 2001, the central command was replaced by market and economic forces with entry of China in WTO. Decisions were decentralized. Chinese management of business was also successful with a combination of Chinese culture and modern management skills. Chinese were more eager to learn by experience and apply management innovation and technological innovation.
What are the Lessons for PNG?
Drawing from significant lessons in China’s economic reform, PNG can drive Vision 2050 by:
1. Diversifying the market economy into special economic zones:
• Agriculture as the backbone of international trade in some highlands and coastal regions
• Encourage more banking system through the country, more ICT Business, competition in state-owned enterprises and stock markets
1. State playing an important role in creating a conducive environment for economic take-off through sound economic policies
2. Combine indigenous knowledge with modern innovative management skills and technological skills
3. People being eager to learn and hardworking – PNG must strive to ‘work to live’ rather than ‘live to work’
Revisiting Manus Detention Diplomacy
Francis Hualupmomi
Last week Australia’s Immigration secretary Andrew Metcalfe and Pacific parliamentary secretary Richard Marles had quietly travelled to Port Moresby to revisit the closed Manus detention center raising heated controversy in Australia and PNG. Whilst the ‘Manus Detention Diplomacy’ may obviously not be in PNG’s national interest, it however, may also be used as an opportunity to maximize outstanding national interest should government favors it.
It appears obvious now that the struggling Labor government is contradicting its own manifestos and perhaps compromising national interest by returning to Howard’s ‘hands on’ policy in the region – a slap in the face of its constituencies. Even Gillard contradict herself during campaign in emphasizing East Timor and Malaysia as an alternative choice. Manus detention centre as a Pacific solution under Howard’s regime was dismantled by former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in settling rough diplomacy with Pacific Islands especially PNG.
Since end of colonization, Australia continues to exercise “hands on” and “ignoring politics” in her external relations with PNG. Canberra continues to assume PNG as its colonial periphery to exploit and impose what it perceives as a testing ground. Australia has an attitude problem in dealing with not only PNG but the rest of the Pacific island countries – she has not learnt her mistakes, for instance with Fiji.
Meanwhile, several political issues remain unsolved between PNG and Australia until Kevin Rudd’s regime. Gillard has misunderstood Labor’s policy towards PNG which Rudd has set in precedence. Australia-PNG bilateral relations under Howard regime was a mass, a repeat of it will not be in the best interest of Australia’s tax payers and PNG government. Most Australian feels that Gillard is too pushy and incapable of handling internal pressure of flooding of unwanted refuges.
The proposal of revisiting Manus detention centre has advantages and disadvantages. PNG government may expect incentives if it accepts the proposal. Whilst the choice of refusal of proposal is in national interest, PNG however, may think of employing it as a leverage to influence policy outcomes with outstanding bilateral issues.
An advantage is that Manus local economy will be serviced by investments as a part of the promise package. PNG may use this proposal as an important opportunity to push for equal regional trade agreements discerning Temporary Workers scheme and others. There is no logic in Canberra being too ignorant in honoring this trade proposal yet ‘telling us what to do’. PNG cannot be blinded by this conservative attitude. If Gillard thinks PNG is a dumping yard, she is probably constructing a mistake as PNG is no longer a sleeping pill let alone her rise in the region. The government should strongly push for Australia to reconsider the scheme and other trade agreements. More so, PNG should negotiate for support on sinking atolls problems in Manus.
Politically, Canberra has continued to calculate NA under Somare-led regime as militant given his past radical anti-colonialism sentiments. Controversially, the politically motivated Motigate saga compounded with other governance issues led by civil societies and the current proposal suggest that PNG should advice Gillard to embrace a “hands off-policy”.
As far as Australia’s national interest is concerned, Gillard should concentrate in dealing with changing dynamics of geopolitical shift in the region. With global shift in power from the West to East with the rise of China constructing a new reconfigured multipolar system, instead Canberra should be playing the Pacific cards to win hearts and minds of PNG. Australia is slowly losing PNG – this is the greatest concern and conundrum. PNG by now is very assertive in its regional approach and has some form of economic power to influence policy outcomes should Australia fail to honor her commitments.
Treating PNG as colonial backyard may not work for Australia. Australia should by now pay some respect for PNG as the leader of Pacific islands nations. One may argue the Pacific archipelago is no longer Canberra’s conventional playing ground. With changing pattern in Pacific politics, Pacific is a contestable theatre where non-zero sum game once pursued by Canberra will be trade-off with new wave of interdependence. Hence Canberra may expect different political outcomes in PNG diplomacy.
On the contrary, in essence, Manus province at the first instance may not service the policy. Manus is also facing the dilemma of sinking atolls which PNG should pay close attention to. Whilst this is the major issue in the island nations, there is an escalation of social discontent and fear among people with Islamism migrants with respect to terrorism and religious fundamentalism. Some argue that there could be a sense of disparity in living standards between refugees and local populous in Manus.
Dealing with refuges from Asia, especially boat people and Middle East has been a problem in Australia. Australia has had a hard time managing it. This trend will continue and Gillard has to deal with it adequately. Given coming elections, this will be a test for her and the Labor party. Australia’s tax payers are counting on her leadership in dealing with soft and hard politics.
More so with late recent death of Osama Bin Laden, it may also be postulated that Australia may find herself in dark shell pondering the infiltration of refuges as potential threats. Increase in Muslim asylum seekers only proliferate threat perception.
The approach under which it (detention centre) has been processed earlier suggest lack of less coherence and pure ignorance as evidenced in the way Australian foreign officials behave towards PNG’s officials. Nonetheless, Australia’s push to have PNG as a regional facility centre is a slap in the face. PNG should refuse in total such scheme as it only paints Australia’s conventional interventionist (neocolonialism) approach.
In my view, Gillard proposal is not in the best of interest of PNG. This is an internal problem which Canberra, as the middle power, has the capacity to deal with it. PNG cannot be used as a dumping ground for exercising external policies. However, should PNG consider this proposal, then it must strongly push for Australia to accommodate PNG’s national interest.
Last week Australia’s Immigration secretary Andrew Metcalfe and Pacific parliamentary secretary Richard Marles had quietly travelled to Port Moresby to revisit the closed Manus detention center raising heated controversy in Australia and PNG. Whilst the ‘Manus Detention Diplomacy’ may obviously not be in PNG’s national interest, it however, may also be used as an opportunity to maximize outstanding national interest should government favors it.
It appears obvious now that the struggling Labor government is contradicting its own manifestos and perhaps compromising national interest by returning to Howard’s ‘hands on’ policy in the region – a slap in the face of its constituencies. Even Gillard contradict herself during campaign in emphasizing East Timor and Malaysia as an alternative choice. Manus detention centre as a Pacific solution under Howard’s regime was dismantled by former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in settling rough diplomacy with Pacific Islands especially PNG.
Since end of colonization, Australia continues to exercise “hands on” and “ignoring politics” in her external relations with PNG. Canberra continues to assume PNG as its colonial periphery to exploit and impose what it perceives as a testing ground. Australia has an attitude problem in dealing with not only PNG but the rest of the Pacific island countries – she has not learnt her mistakes, for instance with Fiji.
Meanwhile, several political issues remain unsolved between PNG and Australia until Kevin Rudd’s regime. Gillard has misunderstood Labor’s policy towards PNG which Rudd has set in precedence. Australia-PNG bilateral relations under Howard regime was a mass, a repeat of it will not be in the best interest of Australia’s tax payers and PNG government. Most Australian feels that Gillard is too pushy and incapable of handling internal pressure of flooding of unwanted refuges.
The proposal of revisiting Manus detention centre has advantages and disadvantages. PNG government may expect incentives if it accepts the proposal. Whilst the choice of refusal of proposal is in national interest, PNG however, may think of employing it as a leverage to influence policy outcomes with outstanding bilateral issues.
An advantage is that Manus local economy will be serviced by investments as a part of the promise package. PNG may use this proposal as an important opportunity to push for equal regional trade agreements discerning Temporary Workers scheme and others. There is no logic in Canberra being too ignorant in honoring this trade proposal yet ‘telling us what to do’. PNG cannot be blinded by this conservative attitude. If Gillard thinks PNG is a dumping yard, she is probably constructing a mistake as PNG is no longer a sleeping pill let alone her rise in the region. The government should strongly push for Australia to reconsider the scheme and other trade agreements. More so, PNG should negotiate for support on sinking atolls problems in Manus.
Politically, Canberra has continued to calculate NA under Somare-led regime as militant given his past radical anti-colonialism sentiments. Controversially, the politically motivated Motigate saga compounded with other governance issues led by civil societies and the current proposal suggest that PNG should advice Gillard to embrace a “hands off-policy”.
As far as Australia’s national interest is concerned, Gillard should concentrate in dealing with changing dynamics of geopolitical shift in the region. With global shift in power from the West to East with the rise of China constructing a new reconfigured multipolar system, instead Canberra should be playing the Pacific cards to win hearts and minds of PNG. Australia is slowly losing PNG – this is the greatest concern and conundrum. PNG by now is very assertive in its regional approach and has some form of economic power to influence policy outcomes should Australia fail to honor her commitments.
Treating PNG as colonial backyard may not work for Australia. Australia should by now pay some respect for PNG as the leader of Pacific islands nations. One may argue the Pacific archipelago is no longer Canberra’s conventional playing ground. With changing pattern in Pacific politics, Pacific is a contestable theatre where non-zero sum game once pursued by Canberra will be trade-off with new wave of interdependence. Hence Canberra may expect different political outcomes in PNG diplomacy.
On the contrary, in essence, Manus province at the first instance may not service the policy. Manus is also facing the dilemma of sinking atolls which PNG should pay close attention to. Whilst this is the major issue in the island nations, there is an escalation of social discontent and fear among people with Islamism migrants with respect to terrorism and religious fundamentalism. Some argue that there could be a sense of disparity in living standards between refugees and local populous in Manus.
Dealing with refuges from Asia, especially boat people and Middle East has been a problem in Australia. Australia has had a hard time managing it. This trend will continue and Gillard has to deal with it adequately. Given coming elections, this will be a test for her and the Labor party. Australia’s tax payers are counting on her leadership in dealing with soft and hard politics.
More so with late recent death of Osama Bin Laden, it may also be postulated that Australia may find herself in dark shell pondering the infiltration of refuges as potential threats. Increase in Muslim asylum seekers only proliferate threat perception.
The approach under which it (detention centre) has been processed earlier suggest lack of less coherence and pure ignorance as evidenced in the way Australian foreign officials behave towards PNG’s officials. Nonetheless, Australia’s push to have PNG as a regional facility centre is a slap in the face. PNG should refuse in total such scheme as it only paints Australia’s conventional interventionist (neocolonialism) approach.
In my view, Gillard proposal is not in the best of interest of PNG. This is an internal problem which Canberra, as the middle power, has the capacity to deal with it. PNG cannot be used as a dumping ground for exercising external policies. However, should PNG consider this proposal, then it must strongly push for Australia to accommodate PNG’s national interest.
Thursday, May 5, 2011
Human Capital and Power Projection: Economic and Strategic Choices
By Francis Hualupmomi
Human capital is one of the most important factors in power projection in a world driven by knowledge-based economy. For PNG to project power in the region given its current economic growth rate, economizing human capital in strategic positions will incur high dividend returns.
It appears that the most important events coinciding with the current economic boom are human capital development and national security. Theoretically, economic and military are the most important intertwined factors in projecting power of the state and its co-existence in the international system govern by ‘rule of the jungle’. Economic and military are both opposite functions of state. That simply means military protect economic wealth and economic wealth build military power, hence projecting power of the state. However, this does not preclude the role of internal security (Police). Police also play an important supporting role in national security.
There are several important scenarios projected in human capital development, however, in this article I intend to focus on economic and strategic (security) scenarios consistent with current economic boom and Vision 2050.
PNG is currently experiencing an economic boom as a result of an unprecedented mining and petroleum activity compounded with construction industry, which will continue in the next 30-50 years. There is also a growing global demand of energy supply by industrialized countries, especially in Asia and Europe consolidated with high domestic demand for human capital in particular, blue collar supply. In my projection security personals and diplomats in the mining and petroleum industry are also important in the next 5-10 years.
The LNG projects and other mining projects will be the engine of economic growth which will require a comprehensive massification of human capital. It is forecasted that a supply of 50,000 human capital within the first 5 years is necessary to develop and operationalise the high impact projects coming on stream. Specialists are required to implement these projects. Specialized fields in science and technology should be the driving force.
With PNG gaining prominence in global market economy, international political economy of trade will become important. In a world of complex interdependence driven by positive zero-sum and non-zero sum games, PNG needs specialized trained diplomats to strategically position its national interest in geoeconomic markets. In addition, strategic thinkers will play an important role in analyzing geopolitical and geostrategic implications in positioning our interest in global market economy.
There is also a need to protect economic benefits in the LNG projects and other mining projects over the coming years. Recently, the Japanese government warned PNG to beef up its security system in order to maximize the opportunities projected from mining and petroleum projects. Protection of economic wealth is necessary to sustain the current continuous rapid growth.
However, the current situation is that there is ‘deficiency’ in human capital supply in these specialized fields. In a state of defunct, both public and private universities and colleges lack capacity to meet demand and supply due to lack of past governments support. There is weak security system to protect the economic benefits – “A new garden without a fence is vulnerable to wild animals”. The LNG projects and other mining projects depend on thinkers and implementers. In order to project power in the region some strategic choices have to be made by the government:
Economic scenario
1. Upgrade public universities and technical colleges;
2. co-opting few private institutions in consistent with international quality assurance best practices;
3. design designated specialized science and technological programs as national projects with the assistant from external sources;
4. establish cross border training and education partnership with key institutions;
5. Increase international scholarships in research, science and technology in prestigious colleges and universities;
6. industry alliance – government through Office of Higher Education coordinates graduates placement in industries;
7. establish diplomatic corps training centre in University of PNG (UPNG) or Public Administration College or a separate entity managed by Foreign Affairs and Trade; and
8. international training in diplomacy in strategic countries.
Strategic and Security Scenario
1. Modernize defence force capacity and capability through increase of defence personal ratio and modernized assets with precision to mend and fend of real or potential threats;
2. establish an Institute of International Security and International Studies (ISIS) designated in providing timely and quality policy advice to government. This could be either situated within UPNG or National Research Institute or a an independent entity of state;
3. introduce military cadet program in secondary schools and existing national high schools;
4. establish and continue to maintain security and strategic ties with key regional partners in capacity building;
5. modernize police force;
6. reintroduce police program in universities;
7. reintroduce direct Police Cadet Training with focus on University Graduates’ and;
8. National Intelligence Organization should be strengthened and modernized.
Although it may be an expensive exercise, in the long run will it pays a massive dividends in return.
In sum, PNG can project power in the region if it can utilize its economic wealth to increase investment in specialized human capital in science and technology and build strategic and security capacity and capability.
Human capital is one of the most important factors in power projection in a world driven by knowledge-based economy. For PNG to project power in the region given its current economic growth rate, economizing human capital in strategic positions will incur high dividend returns.
It appears that the most important events coinciding with the current economic boom are human capital development and national security. Theoretically, economic and military are the most important intertwined factors in projecting power of the state and its co-existence in the international system govern by ‘rule of the jungle’. Economic and military are both opposite functions of state. That simply means military protect economic wealth and economic wealth build military power, hence projecting power of the state. However, this does not preclude the role of internal security (Police). Police also play an important supporting role in national security.
There are several important scenarios projected in human capital development, however, in this article I intend to focus on economic and strategic (security) scenarios consistent with current economic boom and Vision 2050.
PNG is currently experiencing an economic boom as a result of an unprecedented mining and petroleum activity compounded with construction industry, which will continue in the next 30-50 years. There is also a growing global demand of energy supply by industrialized countries, especially in Asia and Europe consolidated with high domestic demand for human capital in particular, blue collar supply. In my projection security personals and diplomats in the mining and petroleum industry are also important in the next 5-10 years.
The LNG projects and other mining projects will be the engine of economic growth which will require a comprehensive massification of human capital. It is forecasted that a supply of 50,000 human capital within the first 5 years is necessary to develop and operationalise the high impact projects coming on stream. Specialists are required to implement these projects. Specialized fields in science and technology should be the driving force.
With PNG gaining prominence in global market economy, international political economy of trade will become important. In a world of complex interdependence driven by positive zero-sum and non-zero sum games, PNG needs specialized trained diplomats to strategically position its national interest in geoeconomic markets. In addition, strategic thinkers will play an important role in analyzing geopolitical and geostrategic implications in positioning our interest in global market economy.
There is also a need to protect economic benefits in the LNG projects and other mining projects over the coming years. Recently, the Japanese government warned PNG to beef up its security system in order to maximize the opportunities projected from mining and petroleum projects. Protection of economic wealth is necessary to sustain the current continuous rapid growth.
However, the current situation is that there is ‘deficiency’ in human capital supply in these specialized fields. In a state of defunct, both public and private universities and colleges lack capacity to meet demand and supply due to lack of past governments support. There is weak security system to protect the economic benefits – “A new garden without a fence is vulnerable to wild animals”. The LNG projects and other mining projects depend on thinkers and implementers. In order to project power in the region some strategic choices have to be made by the government:
Economic scenario
1. Upgrade public universities and technical colleges;
2. co-opting few private institutions in consistent with international quality assurance best practices;
3. design designated specialized science and technological programs as national projects with the assistant from external sources;
4. establish cross border training and education partnership with key institutions;
5. Increase international scholarships in research, science and technology in prestigious colleges and universities;
6. industry alliance – government through Office of Higher Education coordinates graduates placement in industries;
7. establish diplomatic corps training centre in University of PNG (UPNG) or Public Administration College or a separate entity managed by Foreign Affairs and Trade; and
8. international training in diplomacy in strategic countries.
Strategic and Security Scenario
1. Modernize defence force capacity and capability through increase of defence personal ratio and modernized assets with precision to mend and fend of real or potential threats;
2. establish an Institute of International Security and International Studies (ISIS) designated in providing timely and quality policy advice to government. This could be either situated within UPNG or National Research Institute or a an independent entity of state;
3. introduce military cadet program in secondary schools and existing national high schools;
4. establish and continue to maintain security and strategic ties with key regional partners in capacity building;
5. modernize police force;
6. reintroduce police program in universities;
7. reintroduce direct Police Cadet Training with focus on University Graduates’ and;
8. National Intelligence Organization should be strengthened and modernized.
Although it may be an expensive exercise, in the long run will it pays a massive dividends in return.
In sum, PNG can project power in the region if it can utilize its economic wealth to increase investment in specialized human capital in science and technology and build strategic and security capacity and capability.
Security Dimension of Transfer of Land Rights: Policy Implications and Strategic Choices
By Francis Hualupmomi
The debate on transfer of land rights from state to landowners by some political elites, elites, landowners and the populous provoke interesting security implications for PNG. Martin Namarong in his recent article “Land: questions of ownership & sovereignty” on April 26, 2011 in PNG Attitude provides us a logical yet most critical analysis on this issue. I expand his scope of analysis focusing on security dimension and its policy implications.
Some critiques observed that land rights which is normatively considered as a natural birth right of citizens given the traditional heritage in Melanesian society is being politically exploited by competing interests. In quest for modernization and economic imperatives state leadership in the governance of redistribution of wealth has been compromised with external interests provoking suspicious and mutual distrust in the society. The proponents of transfer of land rights argue that the state under a social contract to prudently manage national interest, i.e. landownership in resources, on behalf of its citizens appears contradictory and unwarranted to some extent of mismanagement as exclusively witnessed in unequal benefits-sharing in Panguna Mine, followed by LNG and others.
The issue at hand though, as argued by several legalists and politicians is equal distribution of resources between state and MNCs and landowners. Whilst this may sound welcoming for landowners, there are adverse implications to national security of the state should critical thoughts are not well conceptualized.
First, Sovereignty of the state will be compromised and systematically undermined under the Westphalia system. Sovereignty of the state alludes to the notion of legitimacy, the ‘right to rule’ by the ‘rule of law’ through a social contract. State on behalf of the mass through social contract expressed through election is mandated to prudently manage individual interest legally binded as a collective interest. On this premise, the major argument is that state as a ‘rational man’ is the only legal entrusted custodian possessing legitimate capacity and capability to manage natural resources on behalf of the landowners.
Second, we expect a most likely rebellion by landowners given prolong unsatisfactory perceptions on the government’s management of redistribution of resources. several mini scale rebellion against the state and MNCs such as threats of plant closure, clash with security personals (both state and non-state) to name a few since the operation of MNCs in PNG indicate a tendency of proliferation of near future large scale rebellion.
More over, mining and petroleum in highlands region suggest Mercenary-like military-build over time with given aggregate of monitory incentives through loyalties and dividends. The Singirok Gun Summit report proves threatening and worrisome. The full transfer of landownership rights to land owners is a dangerous and most risky exercise. Legitimizing power on the hands of landlords would most likely convert them into power maximisers constructing real threats to state, MNCs and populous.
As situation reached its full peak the worst case scenario is a mini scale foreign military intervention. Energy is an important economic and strategic interest of any state which if under any circumstances is threatened will instruct military intervention to protect its citizens and socio-economic infrastructures. The Sandline crises, East Timor, Libya, Iraq, Kosovo, Georgia, are some cases in point. A large scale clash between landowners and state and private security personnel is yet to trigger. Recently it was also reported that few southern highlanders had clash with G4S security personals.
The landowners lack capacity and capability to manage resources should the rights are legally transferred. In my view, it would be quite impossible for landowners to manage resources. There are a lot of issues associated with this view. First, we expect unwise spending by landowners in inferior good and services, such as gambling and prostitution in expensive corridors in city lights domestically or overseas. Economic implications may include capital flight and at some point inserting monitory pressure on the economy such as inflation, etc. We also expect increasing social problems such as domestic martial affairs, spread of incurable disease and proliferation of prostitution, transnational crimes, etc.
Nevertheless, the call for autonomy is too early and may not be in the best interest of PNG. Such calls will only provide precedence for autonomization by other provinces and regions. Most provinces lack capacity to administer this process. Finally, transfer of land rights may construct a resource bias in development. Some provinces lack resources and monopoly of resources may not be equally distributed in PNG in aggregate terms.
Given these security implications on the transfer of land rights some strategic choices have to be rationally calculated to maximize national interest to avoid unexpected security challenges:
1. Rectify the legal parameters defining the legitimacy of land rights with state still having some legitimacy over management of resources;
2. Borrow Brunei’s model of state-landowner partnership- state should partner with landowners by providing them monitory incentives through loan to establish national companies without external influence. The state-national companies must employ highly qualified expatriates including nationals with full social protection;
3. The state based on social contract as a legitimate custodian should renegotiate for an absolute gain to attain a 50-50% share, .i.e. a break up of state 30%- landowners 30% and MNCs 40%; and
4. Autonomy is not in the best interest of PNG given the lack of political and administrative capacity.
In sum, absolute gain through equal wealth redistribution must be the national interest in resource sectors.
The debate on transfer of land rights from state to landowners by some political elites, elites, landowners and the populous provoke interesting security implications for PNG. Martin Namarong in his recent article “Land: questions of ownership & sovereignty” on April 26, 2011 in PNG Attitude provides us a logical yet most critical analysis on this issue. I expand his scope of analysis focusing on security dimension and its policy implications.
Some critiques observed that land rights which is normatively considered as a natural birth right of citizens given the traditional heritage in Melanesian society is being politically exploited by competing interests. In quest for modernization and economic imperatives state leadership in the governance of redistribution of wealth has been compromised with external interests provoking suspicious and mutual distrust in the society. The proponents of transfer of land rights argue that the state under a social contract to prudently manage national interest, i.e. landownership in resources, on behalf of its citizens appears contradictory and unwarranted to some extent of mismanagement as exclusively witnessed in unequal benefits-sharing in Panguna Mine, followed by LNG and others.
The issue at hand though, as argued by several legalists and politicians is equal distribution of resources between state and MNCs and landowners. Whilst this may sound welcoming for landowners, there are adverse implications to national security of the state should critical thoughts are not well conceptualized.
First, Sovereignty of the state will be compromised and systematically undermined under the Westphalia system. Sovereignty of the state alludes to the notion of legitimacy, the ‘right to rule’ by the ‘rule of law’ through a social contract. State on behalf of the mass through social contract expressed through election is mandated to prudently manage individual interest legally binded as a collective interest. On this premise, the major argument is that state as a ‘rational man’ is the only legal entrusted custodian possessing legitimate capacity and capability to manage natural resources on behalf of the landowners.
Second, we expect a most likely rebellion by landowners given prolong unsatisfactory perceptions on the government’s management of redistribution of resources. several mini scale rebellion against the state and MNCs such as threats of plant closure, clash with security personals (both state and non-state) to name a few since the operation of MNCs in PNG indicate a tendency of proliferation of near future large scale rebellion.
More over, mining and petroleum in highlands region suggest Mercenary-like military-build over time with given aggregate of monitory incentives through loyalties and dividends. The Singirok Gun Summit report proves threatening and worrisome. The full transfer of landownership rights to land owners is a dangerous and most risky exercise. Legitimizing power on the hands of landlords would most likely convert them into power maximisers constructing real threats to state, MNCs and populous.
As situation reached its full peak the worst case scenario is a mini scale foreign military intervention. Energy is an important economic and strategic interest of any state which if under any circumstances is threatened will instruct military intervention to protect its citizens and socio-economic infrastructures. The Sandline crises, East Timor, Libya, Iraq, Kosovo, Georgia, are some cases in point. A large scale clash between landowners and state and private security personnel is yet to trigger. Recently it was also reported that few southern highlanders had clash with G4S security personals.
The landowners lack capacity and capability to manage resources should the rights are legally transferred. In my view, it would be quite impossible for landowners to manage resources. There are a lot of issues associated with this view. First, we expect unwise spending by landowners in inferior good and services, such as gambling and prostitution in expensive corridors in city lights domestically or overseas. Economic implications may include capital flight and at some point inserting monitory pressure on the economy such as inflation, etc. We also expect increasing social problems such as domestic martial affairs, spread of incurable disease and proliferation of prostitution, transnational crimes, etc.
Nevertheless, the call for autonomy is too early and may not be in the best interest of PNG. Such calls will only provide precedence for autonomization by other provinces and regions. Most provinces lack capacity to administer this process. Finally, transfer of land rights may construct a resource bias in development. Some provinces lack resources and monopoly of resources may not be equally distributed in PNG in aggregate terms.
Given these security implications on the transfer of land rights some strategic choices have to be rationally calculated to maximize national interest to avoid unexpected security challenges:
1. Rectify the legal parameters defining the legitimacy of land rights with state still having some legitimacy over management of resources;
2. Borrow Brunei’s model of state-landowner partnership- state should partner with landowners by providing them monitory incentives through loan to establish national companies without external influence. The state-national companies must employ highly qualified expatriates including nationals with full social protection;
3. The state based on social contract as a legitimate custodian should renegotiate for an absolute gain to attain a 50-50% share, .i.e. a break up of state 30%- landowners 30% and MNCs 40%; and
4. Autonomy is not in the best interest of PNG given the lack of political and administrative capacity.
In sum, absolute gain through equal wealth redistribution must be the national interest in resource sectors.
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