By Francis Hualupmomi
It appears that the domestic politics will affect how PNG interact and make rational strategic choices in the coming regional summit diplomacy in July, 2011. However, this does not preclude its ability to maximize national interest in the competitive playing field.
In the height of political maneuvering of current NA leadership war game at domestic level, three important issues were raised by the sacked former Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister, Don Polye, discerning summit diplomacy at the regional level as reported in Post Courier of 19th July 2011. Polye’s predication begs the question of whether phenomenonal pattern of domestic politics will affect rational decision making in the summit.
As far as regional relations are concerned, these issues are strategically important for PNG to confront the 21st century changing geopolitical power shifting and dynamics – immediate attention by government is absolutely necessary within the context of domestic political tussle.
The first issue at hand concerns the Gillard’s proposal to revisit Manus detention centre, whilst the other two revolve around the ability of the government of the day to participate in the Annual Australia-PNG Ministerial meeting, 44th ASEAN Meeting and 18th ASEAN Regional Meeting to be held in Australia and Bali this July respectively.
Given the magnitude of PNG’s political culture of tension at domestic level, it seems quite clear that the issue of reopening the former asylum centre in Manus province may not likely to take shape as expected. However, this issue may definitely appear on the main agenda in the Annual Australia-PNG Ministerial Forum should it take place this month.
It may be clear on the other hand that the Somare-Abel government may already have a possible response by the projection of the delay. The delay to a certain degree may also give us an indication of possible outcome that either the proposal will be accepted or rejected. The scope of the decision at executive level will depend entirely on the outcome of this meeting or others.
The asylum proposal has been quite controversial in nature due to its failure to produce tangible outcomes which consequently got shut down by Kevin Rudd’s regime. This perhaps could be one of the main reasons which may have shaped Abel’s choice.
However, in the event that this may have popped up in the meeting, the rational choice the government may opt for is to calculate all options available on the table to maximize the optimal preference consistent with national interest.
On the same lane, the ASEAN meetings to be held in Bali are extremely important for PNG given its prominence in Pacific political economy. ASEAN is now the thriving force in global political economy with the Asian tigers and the recent ascendance of China’s rapidly growing economic power.
Interestingly important will be the presence of great power, US, and rising China in the forum meet. In the 21st century, US and China will structurally reshape international relations and global political economy under the US-led liberal order in what is called the Asian century - an argument consistent with Joseph Nye’s dialectics of shift of power from the west to the east.
Now the puzzling question is how can PNG strategically reposition itself in the reconfigured international relations under the framework of ASEAN? Polye has pull the string further by precisely arguing that the indifference in domestic politics may affect PNG’s regional relations and positioning in the forum – one can strongly assume that domestic politics matters in shaping PNG’s regional interactions and positioning.
On the hand, Ano Pala, his successor, has responded with a positive but unclear proposal. It is understood that the Post Courier explicitly reported that Ano Pala and is chief advisor, Michael Mauve, will attend the meeting with no specified meeting proposal. However, it is expected that all is well set for PNG to drive its agenda in the context of national preferences and regional interactions.
The central issue here is how PNG will reshape its size in the forum. With PNG’s elastic wallet given its recent economic performance, it has the economic power to wield some influence in gaining credibility and recognition in the forum. Within the context of economic power maximization, it would rather be a rational choice for PNG to seek permanent status in ASEAN.
PNG cannot afford to lose this important opportunity. Polye’s advice to open some embassies in ASEAN will be a strategic choice as far as national interest is concerned. In projecting the nature of cost-benefit analysis, PNG would stand a better chance to maximize absolute gain. Under the US-led liberal order, although US is economically declining, it will continue to be the regional hegemon providing public good, whilst China’s economic growth will provide an alternative for the region through its hybrid Beijing Consensus.
PNG has caught the ASEAN’s eye already in the Pacific region as the driving economic force given its material resources fundamental in regional political economy and modernization agenda. Should PNG raise the voice of its national anthem in the forum under the framework of gaining permanent status; a possible outcome will be expected.
PNG can wield its economic leverage to shape the decision making behavior of its current investors, for instance, US and China to support its proposal in the forum. The future of PNG’s economic shape and power depends highly on the strategic choices and foreign policy behavior of the current government.
In summative, in the calculus of strategic choice and decision making, it would be wiser for PNG to seize these opportunities in the given summit diplomacy to exercise its growing influence in regional politics. The Annual Australia-PNG Ministerial Meeting is a playing ground in which PNG can opt for better package. In the ASEAN meet, PNG would be better position if it opts for a permanent status – playing the ASEAN card is a strategic choice given the nature and scope of shifting geopolitical geo-economical dynamics.
Wednesday, July 20, 2011
Korea-Pacific Islands Foreign Ministers Meeting: Reshaping PNG-ROK Summit Diplomacy
By Francis Hualupmomi
The recent concluded Korea-Pacific Islands Foreign Ministers meeting in Seoul demonstrates recent dramatic shift in geopolitics with developing countries assuming central role in regional politics. Pacific region has now become one of the hubs of influence with PNG taking the lead as an important emerging geoeconomic power in the region which has geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages in further transforming the national economy.
The reconfigured geopolitical-economic landscape in the region saw old powers and its allies, and competitors playing an active role in shaping PNG’s international behavior. In recent times, we have witnessed the return of US to its backyard given growing Chinese peaceful influence, and stronger interest from EU, Japan and Republic of Korea (ROK) and Canada, whilst others such as South East Asians – Singapore, Thailand Malaysia and Indonesia - continue to invest in the national economy.
We are witnessing a dynamic geopolitical relation where PNG has become more assertive and a confident important regional player given its growing economic power in the region. Auckland University Pacific Studies specialist, Dr Steven Ratuva, articulated that “Papua New Guinea is the growing economic power in the Pacific because of the mining and the resources there” (The National, Wednesday, June 8th 2011).
It was also reported by the same paper that the recent PNG-EU free trade agreement on fishing industry has invaded and threatened EU markets. Hence, economic power constructs PNG’s international behavior with confidence, reputation and recognition.
According to BPNG (2011), PNG economy grew strongly by 8.0% last year (2010) largely attributed to building and construction, transportation, storage, communication, manufacturing and commerce sectors. This year (2011) it is projected to grow by 9.5% largely driven by a pick up in mineral sector and LNG construction.
The IMF (2011) ranked PNG as 34th fastest emerging economy and 1st in the Pacific region. In comparison to our giant neighbors by world ranking, Australia is ranked 120th with a 2.7% growth rate and New Zealand is ranked 142nd with only 1.5% growth rate.
Interestingly, PNG possess geo-economic and geostrategic potential where cooperation and competition among states will proliferate over the coming years. States interest to have a share in PNG’s resources is both an opportunity and a challenge. However, how to manage different relations among key partners is strategically imperative for PNG.
Structurally speaking, resources influence states behavior expressed in terms of competition, however, the complex web of globalization and interdependence makes it easier for states to mutually cooperate in maximizing absolute gains.
Others may see such influx of multifaceted actors in PNG as a geopolitical game of relative gains. While this remains a structural issue given the nature of global scarcity of resources, one must not dismiss the notion of cooperation.
Deepening interstate relations with key partners are a strategic choice to maximize given national preference to gain highest returns or dividends (utility). PNG needs more strategic partners in driving its modernization agenda in the 21st century. Hence, ROK is no exception.
With positive exploration and discoveries of mining and petroleum compounded with increase in world coffee prices and free access to EU fishing market industry, PNG has once again attracted foreign investments from ROK. ROK is one of the 56 official diplomatic countries which PNG has close bilateral relations.
ROK foreign investment ranges from hydro electricity projects to roads and other infrastructure in the country through its overseas development aid program, KOICA.
The PNG-ROK meeting is declared by the foreign affairs and trade minister, Hon. Don Polye in Seoul, ROK, as successful, one which is reshaping a new dimension in bilateral relations. ROK has agreed to provide investments in strategic economic cooperation which include aviation; clean energy, road and infrastructure; and others which will be strengthened by an Investment Protection Agreement in September, 2011 to promote mutual cooperation in investments and trade.
Through this agreement, PNG and ROK airlines will commence commercial services between two countries and South Korean Green Growth University will assist PNG universities, UPNG and UNITEC, to develop a national green policy. In return, ROK would like to see PNG providing more opportunities for its investment in LNG and other strategic areas of economic cooperation.
ROK is one of the East Asian Tigers which has adopted a state-led development model in the 1960s which PNG can also learn and adopt some key lessons. ROK since 1960s has become one of the fastest high-tech industrialized economies.
Four decades ago, it was ranked among other underdeveloped countries experiencing poverty fuelled by its weak economic structures. Currently, according to Economic Intelligence report (2011) it is among the top 20 world economies or top G-20 economies – ranked 15th in the world by nominal GDP and 12th by purchasing power parity (PPP).
ROK is also an important partner in political and economic cooperation and there is need for PNG to further explore other areas of cooperation consistent with Vision 2050. Indeed, ROK is a less resource-rich small island country which relies heavily on raw materials or resources abroad. This economic need provides PNG some opportunities to gain from its (ROK) investment.
Some strategic areas of mutual cooperation include economic reform in areas of human capital investment in science and technology and low-medium-high-tech industry.
There is also need to cooperate in agricultural and maritime trade and investment. PNG could diversify its trade and economic base with ROK. Trade in agricultural and aquatic commodities is a strategic choice (an absolute gain/win-win situation) for PNG.
In sum, PNG-ROK bilateral relation is strategically important in which PNG will mutually benefit in areas which were not provided by some traditional partners. This is an important opportunity to forge new frontiers in international political and economic cooperation.
The recent concluded Korea-Pacific Islands Foreign Ministers meeting in Seoul demonstrates recent dramatic shift in geopolitics with developing countries assuming central role in regional politics. Pacific region has now become one of the hubs of influence with PNG taking the lead as an important emerging geoeconomic power in the region which has geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages in further transforming the national economy.
The reconfigured geopolitical-economic landscape in the region saw old powers and its allies, and competitors playing an active role in shaping PNG’s international behavior. In recent times, we have witnessed the return of US to its backyard given growing Chinese peaceful influence, and stronger interest from EU, Japan and Republic of Korea (ROK) and Canada, whilst others such as South East Asians – Singapore, Thailand Malaysia and Indonesia - continue to invest in the national economy.
We are witnessing a dynamic geopolitical relation where PNG has become more assertive and a confident important regional player given its growing economic power in the region. Auckland University Pacific Studies specialist, Dr Steven Ratuva, articulated that “Papua New Guinea is the growing economic power in the Pacific because of the mining and the resources there” (The National, Wednesday, June 8th 2011).
It was also reported by the same paper that the recent PNG-EU free trade agreement on fishing industry has invaded and threatened EU markets. Hence, economic power constructs PNG’s international behavior with confidence, reputation and recognition.
According to BPNG (2011), PNG economy grew strongly by 8.0% last year (2010) largely attributed to building and construction, transportation, storage, communication, manufacturing and commerce sectors. This year (2011) it is projected to grow by 9.5% largely driven by a pick up in mineral sector and LNG construction.
The IMF (2011) ranked PNG as 34th fastest emerging economy and 1st in the Pacific region. In comparison to our giant neighbors by world ranking, Australia is ranked 120th with a 2.7% growth rate and New Zealand is ranked 142nd with only 1.5% growth rate.
Interestingly, PNG possess geo-economic and geostrategic potential where cooperation and competition among states will proliferate over the coming years. States interest to have a share in PNG’s resources is both an opportunity and a challenge. However, how to manage different relations among key partners is strategically imperative for PNG.
Structurally speaking, resources influence states behavior expressed in terms of competition, however, the complex web of globalization and interdependence makes it easier for states to mutually cooperate in maximizing absolute gains.
Others may see such influx of multifaceted actors in PNG as a geopolitical game of relative gains. While this remains a structural issue given the nature of global scarcity of resources, one must not dismiss the notion of cooperation.
Deepening interstate relations with key partners are a strategic choice to maximize given national preference to gain highest returns or dividends (utility). PNG needs more strategic partners in driving its modernization agenda in the 21st century. Hence, ROK is no exception.
With positive exploration and discoveries of mining and petroleum compounded with increase in world coffee prices and free access to EU fishing market industry, PNG has once again attracted foreign investments from ROK. ROK is one of the 56 official diplomatic countries which PNG has close bilateral relations.
ROK foreign investment ranges from hydro electricity projects to roads and other infrastructure in the country through its overseas development aid program, KOICA.
The PNG-ROK meeting is declared by the foreign affairs and trade minister, Hon. Don Polye in Seoul, ROK, as successful, one which is reshaping a new dimension in bilateral relations. ROK has agreed to provide investments in strategic economic cooperation which include aviation; clean energy, road and infrastructure; and others which will be strengthened by an Investment Protection Agreement in September, 2011 to promote mutual cooperation in investments and trade.
Through this agreement, PNG and ROK airlines will commence commercial services between two countries and South Korean Green Growth University will assist PNG universities, UPNG and UNITEC, to develop a national green policy. In return, ROK would like to see PNG providing more opportunities for its investment in LNG and other strategic areas of economic cooperation.
ROK is one of the East Asian Tigers which has adopted a state-led development model in the 1960s which PNG can also learn and adopt some key lessons. ROK since 1960s has become one of the fastest high-tech industrialized economies.
Four decades ago, it was ranked among other underdeveloped countries experiencing poverty fuelled by its weak economic structures. Currently, according to Economic Intelligence report (2011) it is among the top 20 world economies or top G-20 economies – ranked 15th in the world by nominal GDP and 12th by purchasing power parity (PPP).
ROK is also an important partner in political and economic cooperation and there is need for PNG to further explore other areas of cooperation consistent with Vision 2050. Indeed, ROK is a less resource-rich small island country which relies heavily on raw materials or resources abroad. This economic need provides PNG some opportunities to gain from its (ROK) investment.
Some strategic areas of mutual cooperation include economic reform in areas of human capital investment in science and technology and low-medium-high-tech industry.
There is also need to cooperate in agricultural and maritime trade and investment. PNG could diversify its trade and economic base with ROK. Trade in agricultural and aquatic commodities is a strategic choice (an absolute gain/win-win situation) for PNG.
In sum, PNG-ROK bilateral relation is strategically important in which PNG will mutually benefit in areas which were not provided by some traditional partners. This is an important opportunity to forge new frontiers in international political and economic cooperation.
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
Is 2012 AusAid Budget a Rationale Foreign Policy Choice?
By Francis Hualupmomi in China
The 2012 increase in Australian Aid Budget for PNG raises an interesting question: Is it a rational foreign policy choice?
In international relations, Aid is perceived as one of the most effective soft power foreign policy tools to win hearts and minds of people in a given state of interest by the big power. In this logic, Aid is designed and deployed to either weaken or to strengthen a state depending on the nature of the interest of donor. For instance, in some states in Africa, although there are continuous aid donations from former colonials yet development remains less progressive. This can also be said to PNG with AusAid. Aid therefore, is highly questionable in many developing countries.
According to Joanna McCarthy Australia will donate $520 million in Aid to PNG next year, making it the second biggest recipient. Development Policy Centre also noted that this will be an increase from $4.3bn in 2010-11 to $4.8bn in 2011-12–or from 0.33% to 0.35% of GNI (Gross National Income). Although Australia is still trailing behind other OECDs countries in Aid, it promised to continue increase the figure beyond 2012 given the positive prediction of economic growth from 2012-2016.
The focus of AusAid in PNG expressed in terms of its goals and objectives is to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) through good governance and reducing poverty focusing on strengthening health and education sectors. Whilst this may sound positive in PNG, whether it will be translated into tangible outcomes remain an issue and challenge.
This raises an important question, is AusAid a development tool or politically engineered foreign policy tool aimed at pursuing Australia’s own national interest in the region? These questions can help us calculate Canberra’s intent and motive and its policy implications behind increase in Aid. It is interesting to note that although the trend of Aid has increased annually PNG remains an undeveloped and often blended as a failed state since independence. If Australia’s Aid is generous why do PNG continue to experience development problems?
From observation, since independence with Australia’s development assistance under different political regimes nothing has really changed much in PNG’s development and modernization agenda. Socio-economic landscape remains worsening until recently given poor socio-economic such as health and education indicators, poor higher education socio-economic infrastructures, poor economic infrastructures, corruption, etc.
Moreover, with changes in geopolitical landscape in the Pacific region, especially with the rise of China and its influence in the region, Australia is caught in between the thin red lines. China’s presence and its influence has greatly affected the island nations especially PNG, Fiji and others through its soft power diplomacy. China is the second largest aid donor after Australia in the region. China offer soft or unconditional aid to finance development in the region. PNG is the biggest recipient of Chinese Aid. There is positive effect of Chinese Aid on PNG’s socio-economic development.
Politically, Australia is not only under pressure from Washington over Chinese regional influence but is worried and in fear that it is slowly loosing its peripheries in the region. This is the most immediate conundrum facing Australia in the region. This could suggest that Canberra’s increase in Aid is only a geopolitical competition against China in the region.
If this is the intent and motive behind the increase, this may have policy implications.
First, should PNG development situations continue to be positively affected by other donors than Australian Aid there could be a tendency of shift in policy behavior. There is a feeling of mistrust on Australia’s development assistance. Political leaders and elites may shift preferences to other donors such as China, EU, etc, should they perceive AusAid as an impediment to socio-economic development progress.
Second, history has shown that geostrategic competitions have structural implications in the economy. The more a state spends on relative strategic competitions there is a tendency of it to collapse. The economy might be affected increasing social chaos and poverty. The competition between US and Russia during Cold War shows that strategic competition, for instance, on Mutual Destructive Weapons led Russia to unwise spending on armaments and consequently its collapse.
Given this conundrum in Aid, what should Australia do? Australia should be mindful in playing Aid card in geopolitical competition. Australia should also consider how it could cooperate with other big important partners in aid diplomacy in the region. A cautious and constructive Aid management strategy is necessary to avoid clash of national interest. Should Australia is not careful enough this could be a waste of tax payers’ money and loosing of grip on its major conventional peripheries in the region.
The 2012 increase in Australian Aid Budget for PNG raises an interesting question: Is it a rational foreign policy choice?
In international relations, Aid is perceived as one of the most effective soft power foreign policy tools to win hearts and minds of people in a given state of interest by the big power. In this logic, Aid is designed and deployed to either weaken or to strengthen a state depending on the nature of the interest of donor. For instance, in some states in Africa, although there are continuous aid donations from former colonials yet development remains less progressive. This can also be said to PNG with AusAid. Aid therefore, is highly questionable in many developing countries.
According to Joanna McCarthy Australia will donate $520 million in Aid to PNG next year, making it the second biggest recipient. Development Policy Centre also noted that this will be an increase from $4.3bn in 2010-11 to $4.8bn in 2011-12–or from 0.33% to 0.35% of GNI (Gross National Income). Although Australia is still trailing behind other OECDs countries in Aid, it promised to continue increase the figure beyond 2012 given the positive prediction of economic growth from 2012-2016.
The focus of AusAid in PNG expressed in terms of its goals and objectives is to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) through good governance and reducing poverty focusing on strengthening health and education sectors. Whilst this may sound positive in PNG, whether it will be translated into tangible outcomes remain an issue and challenge.
This raises an important question, is AusAid a development tool or politically engineered foreign policy tool aimed at pursuing Australia’s own national interest in the region? These questions can help us calculate Canberra’s intent and motive and its policy implications behind increase in Aid. It is interesting to note that although the trend of Aid has increased annually PNG remains an undeveloped and often blended as a failed state since independence. If Australia’s Aid is generous why do PNG continue to experience development problems?
From observation, since independence with Australia’s development assistance under different political regimes nothing has really changed much in PNG’s development and modernization agenda. Socio-economic landscape remains worsening until recently given poor socio-economic such as health and education indicators, poor higher education socio-economic infrastructures, poor economic infrastructures, corruption, etc.
Moreover, with changes in geopolitical landscape in the Pacific region, especially with the rise of China and its influence in the region, Australia is caught in between the thin red lines. China’s presence and its influence has greatly affected the island nations especially PNG, Fiji and others through its soft power diplomacy. China is the second largest aid donor after Australia in the region. China offer soft or unconditional aid to finance development in the region. PNG is the biggest recipient of Chinese Aid. There is positive effect of Chinese Aid on PNG’s socio-economic development.
Politically, Australia is not only under pressure from Washington over Chinese regional influence but is worried and in fear that it is slowly loosing its peripheries in the region. This is the most immediate conundrum facing Australia in the region. This could suggest that Canberra’s increase in Aid is only a geopolitical competition against China in the region.
If this is the intent and motive behind the increase, this may have policy implications.
First, should PNG development situations continue to be positively affected by other donors than Australian Aid there could be a tendency of shift in policy behavior. There is a feeling of mistrust on Australia’s development assistance. Political leaders and elites may shift preferences to other donors such as China, EU, etc, should they perceive AusAid as an impediment to socio-economic development progress.
Second, history has shown that geostrategic competitions have structural implications in the economy. The more a state spends on relative strategic competitions there is a tendency of it to collapse. The economy might be affected increasing social chaos and poverty. The competition between US and Russia during Cold War shows that strategic competition, for instance, on Mutual Destructive Weapons led Russia to unwise spending on armaments and consequently its collapse.
Given this conundrum in Aid, what should Australia do? Australia should be mindful in playing Aid card in geopolitical competition. Australia should also consider how it could cooperate with other big important partners in aid diplomacy in the region. A cautious and constructive Aid management strategy is necessary to avoid clash of national interest. Should Australia is not careful enough this could be a waste of tax payers’ money and loosing of grip on its major conventional peripheries in the region.
Friday, May 13, 2011
Who Should Supersede Grand Chief Somare?
Francis Hualupmomi, in China
With Prime Minister (PM) Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare officially being declared medically unfit in maintaining and continuing National Alliance-Coalition(NA) leadership until next election, the question one might ask is who will supersede his leadership? I provide a prediction premised on observation.
It is quite difficult to predict Sir Michael’s successor given the complexity of NA’s coalition make-up, however, from observation we can only construct some most-likely scenarios.
The current NA-Coalition government under Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare over the years has had several leadership competitions among coalition political parties based on regional politics.
From evidence gathered, leadership tussle is between Highlands’ regional camp and Momase Camp, whilst Southern and the Nuigini Islands regional camps seem moderate and bandwagoning.
From this constellation, we can assume a common pattern that Highlands and Momase camps will compete for leadership. We expect three political factions within Highlands regional bloc, the O’Neil’s group, and a split in Enga between current acting PM, Sam Abel’s group, and former deputy PM leader and highlands hot candidate Don Polye’s group. The other highlands political leaders may most likely bandwagon these three groupings depending on their most given preferences.
Given highland’s complex political culture, we expect that a split in Engan groupings would most likely shift alliance to Southern Highlands group. In Southern Highlands, the most likely hottest candidate will be Peter O’Neil. However, that does not dispute a change in Engan politics. Should Engan MPs unite we expect a different scenario. Don Polye would be most likely to assume leadership than Abal.
On the other side of the coin, the Momase camp may also face the similar political competition. We expect a split between Patrick Pruaitch and Arthur Somare. Although both leaders are highly competitive, Arthur may assume leadership for three major reasons. First, Arthur will be most likely preferred over Pruaitch to maintain Grand Chief’s Legacy. Second, Arthur has played an important role in political economic development by bringing ashore many high impact projects such as LNG and public enterprise reforms while serving several ministerial portfolios. Final, Arthur’s leadership may attract NA support in honor and recognition of Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare.
In the middle camp, we have Nuigini Islands and Southern camps, both of which do not possess potential candidates for the leadership. In Nuigini Islands camp, we expect Paul Tiensten to command bandwagoning with Momase camp. In Southern camp, there is a vacuum for possible PM contender after the defection of former deputy Prime Minister, Sir Puka Temu, to Opposition.
Given this political situation, we expect two possible scenarios. First, both camps may remain faithful with Momase camp in fear of loosing leadership to highlands region. Second, there will be a split within the camps between Pro-Somare and pro-Pruaitch factions. Although there is possibility of defections of MPs in coastal regional bloc to highlands regional bloc this may less likely to occur.
From the situational analysis, we can draw some conclusions. First, a possible political instability within NA-Coalition is inevitable. Second, we expect some unexpected leadership shift in highlands regional camp with new faces should there be a stalemate in leadership between Enga and Southern Highlands. Third, we expect split in Momase regional camp, however, it is most likely that Arthur may possibly assume leadership. Fourth, we also expect a split between Nuigini Islands and Southern regional Camps; however, it is most likely that both will support Momase camp.
This leaves us with four most likely possible candidates: Arthur; Abal; Polye; and O’Neil. In projecting a rough prediction, we expect Arthur Somare to reign should there is stalemate between highlands regional MPs. However, should highlands regional MPs unite, we expect Don Polye to assume leadership.
With Prime Minister (PM) Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare officially being declared medically unfit in maintaining and continuing National Alliance-Coalition(NA) leadership until next election, the question one might ask is who will supersede his leadership? I provide a prediction premised on observation.
It is quite difficult to predict Sir Michael’s successor given the complexity of NA’s coalition make-up, however, from observation we can only construct some most-likely scenarios.
The current NA-Coalition government under Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare over the years has had several leadership competitions among coalition political parties based on regional politics.
From evidence gathered, leadership tussle is between Highlands’ regional camp and Momase Camp, whilst Southern and the Nuigini Islands regional camps seem moderate and bandwagoning.
From this constellation, we can assume a common pattern that Highlands and Momase camps will compete for leadership. We expect three political factions within Highlands regional bloc, the O’Neil’s group, and a split in Enga between current acting PM, Sam Abel’s group, and former deputy PM leader and highlands hot candidate Don Polye’s group. The other highlands political leaders may most likely bandwagon these three groupings depending on their most given preferences.
Given highland’s complex political culture, we expect that a split in Engan groupings would most likely shift alliance to Southern Highlands group. In Southern Highlands, the most likely hottest candidate will be Peter O’Neil. However, that does not dispute a change in Engan politics. Should Engan MPs unite we expect a different scenario. Don Polye would be most likely to assume leadership than Abal.
On the other side of the coin, the Momase camp may also face the similar political competition. We expect a split between Patrick Pruaitch and Arthur Somare. Although both leaders are highly competitive, Arthur may assume leadership for three major reasons. First, Arthur will be most likely preferred over Pruaitch to maintain Grand Chief’s Legacy. Second, Arthur has played an important role in political economic development by bringing ashore many high impact projects such as LNG and public enterprise reforms while serving several ministerial portfolios. Final, Arthur’s leadership may attract NA support in honor and recognition of Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare.
In the middle camp, we have Nuigini Islands and Southern camps, both of which do not possess potential candidates for the leadership. In Nuigini Islands camp, we expect Paul Tiensten to command bandwagoning with Momase camp. In Southern camp, there is a vacuum for possible PM contender after the defection of former deputy Prime Minister, Sir Puka Temu, to Opposition.
Given this political situation, we expect two possible scenarios. First, both camps may remain faithful with Momase camp in fear of loosing leadership to highlands region. Second, there will be a split within the camps between Pro-Somare and pro-Pruaitch factions. Although there is possibility of defections of MPs in coastal regional bloc to highlands regional bloc this may less likely to occur.
From the situational analysis, we can draw some conclusions. First, a possible political instability within NA-Coalition is inevitable. Second, we expect some unexpected leadership shift in highlands regional camp with new faces should there be a stalemate in leadership between Enga and Southern Highlands. Third, we expect split in Momase regional camp, however, it is most likely that Arthur may possibly assume leadership. Fourth, we also expect a split between Nuigini Islands and Southern regional Camps; however, it is most likely that both will support Momase camp.
This leaves us with four most likely possible candidates: Arthur; Abal; Polye; and O’Neil. In projecting a rough prediction, we expect Arthur Somare to reign should there is stalemate between highlands regional MPs. However, should highlands regional MPs unite, we expect Don Polye to assume leadership.
Thursday, May 12, 2011
Political Economy of China’s Economic Reform: Lessons for PNG Vision 2050
By Francis Hualupmomi
In this article, I draw some interesting lessons from China’s Economic Reform. I hope it provides some insights to drive Vision 2050. Today, China boasts the second largest world economy superseding Japan in 2010. China’s remarkable economic success was driven by its post-Mao economic reform. The question is: What factors stimulate its economic success? Is there a lesson for PNG?
China’s Economic Reform and Its Characteristics
Reform
Sacks and Woo (2003) accentuate that China is now in the midst of three historic economic transformations and transition from a planned economy to a market economy, economic development from a largely subsistence peasant economy to an industrialized economy with a modern service sector, and economic globalization from autarky to an important node within the global production network. The economic reform of China begins in 1979 under Deng Xiaoping. Deng pursued an “Open Door Policy” from Mao’s “Isolation Policy” employing a hybrid model of socialist free market. The reform focuses on international trade and privatization of all state-owned enterprises.
In 1990, six special economic zones were established including Shanghai Pudong zone specifically designed for attracting foreign capital. The government supported agriculture through creation of contract responsibilities. In this special arrangement, farmers could sell their commodities abroad with an aim to finance China’s modernization agenda.
Between late 1980s and early 1990s, the focus was on creating a pricing system using dual tracking system and increasing the role of state in resource allocation. The government diversified the market economy of private enterprises and foreign capital by reducing state monopoly. The market economy was left to invisible hands to influence economic pattern in driving the economy.
By late 1990s, the government focuses on reforming unprofitable state enterprises and banking system insolvency. State-owned enterprises and banks underwent a rapid transformation promoting effectiveness and efficiency. In the beginning of 21st century under Hu Jintao, focus was on domestic economic development to ensure a harmonious society.
Types of Business Enterprises Reform
There are four main types of enterprise reform that stimulated China’s economic success. The first is the privatization of state-owned enterprise managed by the Bureau of Managing Council. In this new arrangement, workers do not own shares but only receive salary based on performance. The Bureau employs mostly Chinese western-graduate nationals and homegrown nationals to manage the enterprises with an objective to give confidence to their own nationals.
Second, the stock companies were converted from state control to private control. In this arrangement, enterprises earn some shares whilst the rest go to state. Managers are also legally allowed to hold some shares.
Third, the government promoted a market-oriented private business protected by the government. All Banks provide low interest loans to variety of business to facilitate economic modernization. Final and last is the conversion of foreign fund enterprises (joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprise).
Special Chinese Characteristics of the Economic Reform
The Chinese economic reform constitutes some distinct characteristics which play an important role in driving the economy.
• State-led policies
• Decentralization of state powers to different individuals, groups, and business in decision making and management of the market economy
• A socialist free market
• Development of special economic zones
• Diversification of state banks to meet private business needs at a low interest rates
• Employ highly educated nationals
• Combination of chinese characteristics and modern management skills
• Encourage modern management and technological innovation
• Chinese are great learners and hardworking – Work to live philosophy
• Non-state led enterprise reform
• International trade focusing on agricultural areas as the economic base
• Convert state-owned entities into private business or enterprises
Success of the Economic Reform
The reform was successful for over 3 decades. The outcome from three processes of economic transformation was astounding proving a sustainable average annual GDP growth rate of 8% from 1979–2011. Industrialization, open organization and internationalization extremely drive the shift towards market economy.
Since the reform in 1979 the economy has grown rapidly. In 2004, China was ranked 6th in world economy. The GDP per capita was about US$ 1267. In the same year, the IMF reported an increase in GDP by 9.5% up to US$ 1.647 trillion. In 2011, China’s economy is expected to grow by 8% despite slow recovery in 2008 economic crises (Mussa, 2010).
The reform overwhelmingly attracted foreign investment, for instance, in 2004, 45% export was produced by foreign funds and enterprises. China was ranked as the third biggest trading country after US and EU. More than 20% of foreign trade came from china as reported by IMF.
Interestingly, free market under invisible hand had played an important role in the economy. In 2001, the central command was replaced by market and economic forces with entry of China in WTO. Decisions were decentralized. Chinese management of business was also successful with a combination of Chinese culture and modern management skills. Chinese were more eager to learn by experience and apply management innovation and technological innovation.
What are the Lessons for PNG?
Drawing from significant lessons in China’s economic reform, PNG can drive Vision 2050 by:
1. Diversifying the market economy into special economic zones:
• Agriculture as the backbone of international trade in some highlands and coastal regions
• Encourage more banking system through the country, more ICT Business, competition in state-owned enterprises and stock markets
1. State playing an important role in creating a conducive environment for economic take-off through sound economic policies
2. Combine indigenous knowledge with modern innovative management skills and technological skills
3. People being eager to learn and hardworking – PNG must strive to ‘work to live’ rather than ‘live to work’
In this article, I draw some interesting lessons from China’s Economic Reform. I hope it provides some insights to drive Vision 2050. Today, China boasts the second largest world economy superseding Japan in 2010. China’s remarkable economic success was driven by its post-Mao economic reform. The question is: What factors stimulate its economic success? Is there a lesson for PNG?
China’s Economic Reform and Its Characteristics
Reform
Sacks and Woo (2003) accentuate that China is now in the midst of three historic economic transformations and transition from a planned economy to a market economy, economic development from a largely subsistence peasant economy to an industrialized economy with a modern service sector, and economic globalization from autarky to an important node within the global production network. The economic reform of China begins in 1979 under Deng Xiaoping. Deng pursued an “Open Door Policy” from Mao’s “Isolation Policy” employing a hybrid model of socialist free market. The reform focuses on international trade and privatization of all state-owned enterprises.
In 1990, six special economic zones were established including Shanghai Pudong zone specifically designed for attracting foreign capital. The government supported agriculture through creation of contract responsibilities. In this special arrangement, farmers could sell their commodities abroad with an aim to finance China’s modernization agenda.
Between late 1980s and early 1990s, the focus was on creating a pricing system using dual tracking system and increasing the role of state in resource allocation. The government diversified the market economy of private enterprises and foreign capital by reducing state monopoly. The market economy was left to invisible hands to influence economic pattern in driving the economy.
By late 1990s, the government focuses on reforming unprofitable state enterprises and banking system insolvency. State-owned enterprises and banks underwent a rapid transformation promoting effectiveness and efficiency. In the beginning of 21st century under Hu Jintao, focus was on domestic economic development to ensure a harmonious society.
Types of Business Enterprises Reform
There are four main types of enterprise reform that stimulated China’s economic success. The first is the privatization of state-owned enterprise managed by the Bureau of Managing Council. In this new arrangement, workers do not own shares but only receive salary based on performance. The Bureau employs mostly Chinese western-graduate nationals and homegrown nationals to manage the enterprises with an objective to give confidence to their own nationals.
Second, the stock companies were converted from state control to private control. In this arrangement, enterprises earn some shares whilst the rest go to state. Managers are also legally allowed to hold some shares.
Third, the government promoted a market-oriented private business protected by the government. All Banks provide low interest loans to variety of business to facilitate economic modernization. Final and last is the conversion of foreign fund enterprises (joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprise).
Special Chinese Characteristics of the Economic Reform
The Chinese economic reform constitutes some distinct characteristics which play an important role in driving the economy.
• State-led policies
• Decentralization of state powers to different individuals, groups, and business in decision making and management of the market economy
• A socialist free market
• Development of special economic zones
• Diversification of state banks to meet private business needs at a low interest rates
• Employ highly educated nationals
• Combination of chinese characteristics and modern management skills
• Encourage modern management and technological innovation
• Chinese are great learners and hardworking – Work to live philosophy
• Non-state led enterprise reform
• International trade focusing on agricultural areas as the economic base
• Convert state-owned entities into private business or enterprises
Success of the Economic Reform
The reform was successful for over 3 decades. The outcome from three processes of economic transformation was astounding proving a sustainable average annual GDP growth rate of 8% from 1979–2011. Industrialization, open organization and internationalization extremely drive the shift towards market economy.
Since the reform in 1979 the economy has grown rapidly. In 2004, China was ranked 6th in world economy. The GDP per capita was about US$ 1267. In the same year, the IMF reported an increase in GDP by 9.5% up to US$ 1.647 trillion. In 2011, China’s economy is expected to grow by 8% despite slow recovery in 2008 economic crises (Mussa, 2010).
The reform overwhelmingly attracted foreign investment, for instance, in 2004, 45% export was produced by foreign funds and enterprises. China was ranked as the third biggest trading country after US and EU. More than 20% of foreign trade came from china as reported by IMF.
Interestingly, free market under invisible hand had played an important role in the economy. In 2001, the central command was replaced by market and economic forces with entry of China in WTO. Decisions were decentralized. Chinese management of business was also successful with a combination of Chinese culture and modern management skills. Chinese were more eager to learn by experience and apply management innovation and technological innovation.
What are the Lessons for PNG?
Drawing from significant lessons in China’s economic reform, PNG can drive Vision 2050 by:
1. Diversifying the market economy into special economic zones:
• Agriculture as the backbone of international trade in some highlands and coastal regions
• Encourage more banking system through the country, more ICT Business, competition in state-owned enterprises and stock markets
1. State playing an important role in creating a conducive environment for economic take-off through sound economic policies
2. Combine indigenous knowledge with modern innovative management skills and technological skills
3. People being eager to learn and hardworking – PNG must strive to ‘work to live’ rather than ‘live to work’
Revisiting Manus Detention Diplomacy
Francis Hualupmomi
Last week Australia’s Immigration secretary Andrew Metcalfe and Pacific parliamentary secretary Richard Marles had quietly travelled to Port Moresby to revisit the closed Manus detention center raising heated controversy in Australia and PNG. Whilst the ‘Manus Detention Diplomacy’ may obviously not be in PNG’s national interest, it however, may also be used as an opportunity to maximize outstanding national interest should government favors it.
It appears obvious now that the struggling Labor government is contradicting its own manifestos and perhaps compromising national interest by returning to Howard’s ‘hands on’ policy in the region – a slap in the face of its constituencies. Even Gillard contradict herself during campaign in emphasizing East Timor and Malaysia as an alternative choice. Manus detention centre as a Pacific solution under Howard’s regime was dismantled by former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in settling rough diplomacy with Pacific Islands especially PNG.
Since end of colonization, Australia continues to exercise “hands on” and “ignoring politics” in her external relations with PNG. Canberra continues to assume PNG as its colonial periphery to exploit and impose what it perceives as a testing ground. Australia has an attitude problem in dealing with not only PNG but the rest of the Pacific island countries – she has not learnt her mistakes, for instance with Fiji.
Meanwhile, several political issues remain unsolved between PNG and Australia until Kevin Rudd’s regime. Gillard has misunderstood Labor’s policy towards PNG which Rudd has set in precedence. Australia-PNG bilateral relations under Howard regime was a mass, a repeat of it will not be in the best interest of Australia’s tax payers and PNG government. Most Australian feels that Gillard is too pushy and incapable of handling internal pressure of flooding of unwanted refuges.
The proposal of revisiting Manus detention centre has advantages and disadvantages. PNG government may expect incentives if it accepts the proposal. Whilst the choice of refusal of proposal is in national interest, PNG however, may think of employing it as a leverage to influence policy outcomes with outstanding bilateral issues.
An advantage is that Manus local economy will be serviced by investments as a part of the promise package. PNG may use this proposal as an important opportunity to push for equal regional trade agreements discerning Temporary Workers scheme and others. There is no logic in Canberra being too ignorant in honoring this trade proposal yet ‘telling us what to do’. PNG cannot be blinded by this conservative attitude. If Gillard thinks PNG is a dumping yard, she is probably constructing a mistake as PNG is no longer a sleeping pill let alone her rise in the region. The government should strongly push for Australia to reconsider the scheme and other trade agreements. More so, PNG should negotiate for support on sinking atolls problems in Manus.
Politically, Canberra has continued to calculate NA under Somare-led regime as militant given his past radical anti-colonialism sentiments. Controversially, the politically motivated Motigate saga compounded with other governance issues led by civil societies and the current proposal suggest that PNG should advice Gillard to embrace a “hands off-policy”.
As far as Australia’s national interest is concerned, Gillard should concentrate in dealing with changing dynamics of geopolitical shift in the region. With global shift in power from the West to East with the rise of China constructing a new reconfigured multipolar system, instead Canberra should be playing the Pacific cards to win hearts and minds of PNG. Australia is slowly losing PNG – this is the greatest concern and conundrum. PNG by now is very assertive in its regional approach and has some form of economic power to influence policy outcomes should Australia fail to honor her commitments.
Treating PNG as colonial backyard may not work for Australia. Australia should by now pay some respect for PNG as the leader of Pacific islands nations. One may argue the Pacific archipelago is no longer Canberra’s conventional playing ground. With changing pattern in Pacific politics, Pacific is a contestable theatre where non-zero sum game once pursued by Canberra will be trade-off with new wave of interdependence. Hence Canberra may expect different political outcomes in PNG diplomacy.
On the contrary, in essence, Manus province at the first instance may not service the policy. Manus is also facing the dilemma of sinking atolls which PNG should pay close attention to. Whilst this is the major issue in the island nations, there is an escalation of social discontent and fear among people with Islamism migrants with respect to terrorism and religious fundamentalism. Some argue that there could be a sense of disparity in living standards between refugees and local populous in Manus.
Dealing with refuges from Asia, especially boat people and Middle East has been a problem in Australia. Australia has had a hard time managing it. This trend will continue and Gillard has to deal with it adequately. Given coming elections, this will be a test for her and the Labor party. Australia’s tax payers are counting on her leadership in dealing with soft and hard politics.
More so with late recent death of Osama Bin Laden, it may also be postulated that Australia may find herself in dark shell pondering the infiltration of refuges as potential threats. Increase in Muslim asylum seekers only proliferate threat perception.
The approach under which it (detention centre) has been processed earlier suggest lack of less coherence and pure ignorance as evidenced in the way Australian foreign officials behave towards PNG’s officials. Nonetheless, Australia’s push to have PNG as a regional facility centre is a slap in the face. PNG should refuse in total such scheme as it only paints Australia’s conventional interventionist (neocolonialism) approach.
In my view, Gillard proposal is not in the best of interest of PNG. This is an internal problem which Canberra, as the middle power, has the capacity to deal with it. PNG cannot be used as a dumping ground for exercising external policies. However, should PNG consider this proposal, then it must strongly push for Australia to accommodate PNG’s national interest.
Last week Australia’s Immigration secretary Andrew Metcalfe and Pacific parliamentary secretary Richard Marles had quietly travelled to Port Moresby to revisit the closed Manus detention center raising heated controversy in Australia and PNG. Whilst the ‘Manus Detention Diplomacy’ may obviously not be in PNG’s national interest, it however, may also be used as an opportunity to maximize outstanding national interest should government favors it.
It appears obvious now that the struggling Labor government is contradicting its own manifestos and perhaps compromising national interest by returning to Howard’s ‘hands on’ policy in the region – a slap in the face of its constituencies. Even Gillard contradict herself during campaign in emphasizing East Timor and Malaysia as an alternative choice. Manus detention centre as a Pacific solution under Howard’s regime was dismantled by former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in settling rough diplomacy with Pacific Islands especially PNG.
Since end of colonization, Australia continues to exercise “hands on” and “ignoring politics” in her external relations with PNG. Canberra continues to assume PNG as its colonial periphery to exploit and impose what it perceives as a testing ground. Australia has an attitude problem in dealing with not only PNG but the rest of the Pacific island countries – she has not learnt her mistakes, for instance with Fiji.
Meanwhile, several political issues remain unsolved between PNG and Australia until Kevin Rudd’s regime. Gillard has misunderstood Labor’s policy towards PNG which Rudd has set in precedence. Australia-PNG bilateral relations under Howard regime was a mass, a repeat of it will not be in the best interest of Australia’s tax payers and PNG government. Most Australian feels that Gillard is too pushy and incapable of handling internal pressure of flooding of unwanted refuges.
The proposal of revisiting Manus detention centre has advantages and disadvantages. PNG government may expect incentives if it accepts the proposal. Whilst the choice of refusal of proposal is in national interest, PNG however, may think of employing it as a leverage to influence policy outcomes with outstanding bilateral issues.
An advantage is that Manus local economy will be serviced by investments as a part of the promise package. PNG may use this proposal as an important opportunity to push for equal regional trade agreements discerning Temporary Workers scheme and others. There is no logic in Canberra being too ignorant in honoring this trade proposal yet ‘telling us what to do’. PNG cannot be blinded by this conservative attitude. If Gillard thinks PNG is a dumping yard, she is probably constructing a mistake as PNG is no longer a sleeping pill let alone her rise in the region. The government should strongly push for Australia to reconsider the scheme and other trade agreements. More so, PNG should negotiate for support on sinking atolls problems in Manus.
Politically, Canberra has continued to calculate NA under Somare-led regime as militant given his past radical anti-colonialism sentiments. Controversially, the politically motivated Motigate saga compounded with other governance issues led by civil societies and the current proposal suggest that PNG should advice Gillard to embrace a “hands off-policy”.
As far as Australia’s national interest is concerned, Gillard should concentrate in dealing with changing dynamics of geopolitical shift in the region. With global shift in power from the West to East with the rise of China constructing a new reconfigured multipolar system, instead Canberra should be playing the Pacific cards to win hearts and minds of PNG. Australia is slowly losing PNG – this is the greatest concern and conundrum. PNG by now is very assertive in its regional approach and has some form of economic power to influence policy outcomes should Australia fail to honor her commitments.
Treating PNG as colonial backyard may not work for Australia. Australia should by now pay some respect for PNG as the leader of Pacific islands nations. One may argue the Pacific archipelago is no longer Canberra’s conventional playing ground. With changing pattern in Pacific politics, Pacific is a contestable theatre where non-zero sum game once pursued by Canberra will be trade-off with new wave of interdependence. Hence Canberra may expect different political outcomes in PNG diplomacy.
On the contrary, in essence, Manus province at the first instance may not service the policy. Manus is also facing the dilemma of sinking atolls which PNG should pay close attention to. Whilst this is the major issue in the island nations, there is an escalation of social discontent and fear among people with Islamism migrants with respect to terrorism and religious fundamentalism. Some argue that there could be a sense of disparity in living standards between refugees and local populous in Manus.
Dealing with refuges from Asia, especially boat people and Middle East has been a problem in Australia. Australia has had a hard time managing it. This trend will continue and Gillard has to deal with it adequately. Given coming elections, this will be a test for her and the Labor party. Australia’s tax payers are counting on her leadership in dealing with soft and hard politics.
More so with late recent death of Osama Bin Laden, it may also be postulated that Australia may find herself in dark shell pondering the infiltration of refuges as potential threats. Increase in Muslim asylum seekers only proliferate threat perception.
The approach under which it (detention centre) has been processed earlier suggest lack of less coherence and pure ignorance as evidenced in the way Australian foreign officials behave towards PNG’s officials. Nonetheless, Australia’s push to have PNG as a regional facility centre is a slap in the face. PNG should refuse in total such scheme as it only paints Australia’s conventional interventionist (neocolonialism) approach.
In my view, Gillard proposal is not in the best of interest of PNG. This is an internal problem which Canberra, as the middle power, has the capacity to deal with it. PNG cannot be used as a dumping ground for exercising external policies. However, should PNG consider this proposal, then it must strongly push for Australia to accommodate PNG’s national interest.
Thursday, May 5, 2011
Human Capital and Power Projection: Economic and Strategic Choices
By Francis Hualupmomi
Human capital is one of the most important factors in power projection in a world driven by knowledge-based economy. For PNG to project power in the region given its current economic growth rate, economizing human capital in strategic positions will incur high dividend returns.
It appears that the most important events coinciding with the current economic boom are human capital development and national security. Theoretically, economic and military are the most important intertwined factors in projecting power of the state and its co-existence in the international system govern by ‘rule of the jungle’. Economic and military are both opposite functions of state. That simply means military protect economic wealth and economic wealth build military power, hence projecting power of the state. However, this does not preclude the role of internal security (Police). Police also play an important supporting role in national security.
There are several important scenarios projected in human capital development, however, in this article I intend to focus on economic and strategic (security) scenarios consistent with current economic boom and Vision 2050.
PNG is currently experiencing an economic boom as a result of an unprecedented mining and petroleum activity compounded with construction industry, which will continue in the next 30-50 years. There is also a growing global demand of energy supply by industrialized countries, especially in Asia and Europe consolidated with high domestic demand for human capital in particular, blue collar supply. In my projection security personals and diplomats in the mining and petroleum industry are also important in the next 5-10 years.
The LNG projects and other mining projects will be the engine of economic growth which will require a comprehensive massification of human capital. It is forecasted that a supply of 50,000 human capital within the first 5 years is necessary to develop and operationalise the high impact projects coming on stream. Specialists are required to implement these projects. Specialized fields in science and technology should be the driving force.
With PNG gaining prominence in global market economy, international political economy of trade will become important. In a world of complex interdependence driven by positive zero-sum and non-zero sum games, PNG needs specialized trained diplomats to strategically position its national interest in geoeconomic markets. In addition, strategic thinkers will play an important role in analyzing geopolitical and geostrategic implications in positioning our interest in global market economy.
There is also a need to protect economic benefits in the LNG projects and other mining projects over the coming years. Recently, the Japanese government warned PNG to beef up its security system in order to maximize the opportunities projected from mining and petroleum projects. Protection of economic wealth is necessary to sustain the current continuous rapid growth.
However, the current situation is that there is ‘deficiency’ in human capital supply in these specialized fields. In a state of defunct, both public and private universities and colleges lack capacity to meet demand and supply due to lack of past governments support. There is weak security system to protect the economic benefits – “A new garden without a fence is vulnerable to wild animals”. The LNG projects and other mining projects depend on thinkers and implementers. In order to project power in the region some strategic choices have to be made by the government:
Economic scenario
1. Upgrade public universities and technical colleges;
2. co-opting few private institutions in consistent with international quality assurance best practices;
3. design designated specialized science and technological programs as national projects with the assistant from external sources;
4. establish cross border training and education partnership with key institutions;
5. Increase international scholarships in research, science and technology in prestigious colleges and universities;
6. industry alliance – government through Office of Higher Education coordinates graduates placement in industries;
7. establish diplomatic corps training centre in University of PNG (UPNG) or Public Administration College or a separate entity managed by Foreign Affairs and Trade; and
8. international training in diplomacy in strategic countries.
Strategic and Security Scenario
1. Modernize defence force capacity and capability through increase of defence personal ratio and modernized assets with precision to mend and fend of real or potential threats;
2. establish an Institute of International Security and International Studies (ISIS) designated in providing timely and quality policy advice to government. This could be either situated within UPNG or National Research Institute or a an independent entity of state;
3. introduce military cadet program in secondary schools and existing national high schools;
4. establish and continue to maintain security and strategic ties with key regional partners in capacity building;
5. modernize police force;
6. reintroduce police program in universities;
7. reintroduce direct Police Cadet Training with focus on University Graduates’ and;
8. National Intelligence Organization should be strengthened and modernized.
Although it may be an expensive exercise, in the long run will it pays a massive dividends in return.
In sum, PNG can project power in the region if it can utilize its economic wealth to increase investment in specialized human capital in science and technology and build strategic and security capacity and capability.
Human capital is one of the most important factors in power projection in a world driven by knowledge-based economy. For PNG to project power in the region given its current economic growth rate, economizing human capital in strategic positions will incur high dividend returns.
It appears that the most important events coinciding with the current economic boom are human capital development and national security. Theoretically, economic and military are the most important intertwined factors in projecting power of the state and its co-existence in the international system govern by ‘rule of the jungle’. Economic and military are both opposite functions of state. That simply means military protect economic wealth and economic wealth build military power, hence projecting power of the state. However, this does not preclude the role of internal security (Police). Police also play an important supporting role in national security.
There are several important scenarios projected in human capital development, however, in this article I intend to focus on economic and strategic (security) scenarios consistent with current economic boom and Vision 2050.
PNG is currently experiencing an economic boom as a result of an unprecedented mining and petroleum activity compounded with construction industry, which will continue in the next 30-50 years. There is also a growing global demand of energy supply by industrialized countries, especially in Asia and Europe consolidated with high domestic demand for human capital in particular, blue collar supply. In my projection security personals and diplomats in the mining and petroleum industry are also important in the next 5-10 years.
The LNG projects and other mining projects will be the engine of economic growth which will require a comprehensive massification of human capital. It is forecasted that a supply of 50,000 human capital within the first 5 years is necessary to develop and operationalise the high impact projects coming on stream. Specialists are required to implement these projects. Specialized fields in science and technology should be the driving force.
With PNG gaining prominence in global market economy, international political economy of trade will become important. In a world of complex interdependence driven by positive zero-sum and non-zero sum games, PNG needs specialized trained diplomats to strategically position its national interest in geoeconomic markets. In addition, strategic thinkers will play an important role in analyzing geopolitical and geostrategic implications in positioning our interest in global market economy.
There is also a need to protect economic benefits in the LNG projects and other mining projects over the coming years. Recently, the Japanese government warned PNG to beef up its security system in order to maximize the opportunities projected from mining and petroleum projects. Protection of economic wealth is necessary to sustain the current continuous rapid growth.
However, the current situation is that there is ‘deficiency’ in human capital supply in these specialized fields. In a state of defunct, both public and private universities and colleges lack capacity to meet demand and supply due to lack of past governments support. There is weak security system to protect the economic benefits – “A new garden without a fence is vulnerable to wild animals”. The LNG projects and other mining projects depend on thinkers and implementers. In order to project power in the region some strategic choices have to be made by the government:
Economic scenario
1. Upgrade public universities and technical colleges;
2. co-opting few private institutions in consistent with international quality assurance best practices;
3. design designated specialized science and technological programs as national projects with the assistant from external sources;
4. establish cross border training and education partnership with key institutions;
5. Increase international scholarships in research, science and technology in prestigious colleges and universities;
6. industry alliance – government through Office of Higher Education coordinates graduates placement in industries;
7. establish diplomatic corps training centre in University of PNG (UPNG) or Public Administration College or a separate entity managed by Foreign Affairs and Trade; and
8. international training in diplomacy in strategic countries.
Strategic and Security Scenario
1. Modernize defence force capacity and capability through increase of defence personal ratio and modernized assets with precision to mend and fend of real or potential threats;
2. establish an Institute of International Security and International Studies (ISIS) designated in providing timely and quality policy advice to government. This could be either situated within UPNG or National Research Institute or a an independent entity of state;
3. introduce military cadet program in secondary schools and existing national high schools;
4. establish and continue to maintain security and strategic ties with key regional partners in capacity building;
5. modernize police force;
6. reintroduce police program in universities;
7. reintroduce direct Police Cadet Training with focus on University Graduates’ and;
8. National Intelligence Organization should be strengthened and modernized.
Although it may be an expensive exercise, in the long run will it pays a massive dividends in return.
In sum, PNG can project power in the region if it can utilize its economic wealth to increase investment in specialized human capital in science and technology and build strategic and security capacity and capability.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)